The Fatal Flaw: Nine Points India Ignores about Pakistan

Jan 9, 2016, IndiaFact.Org

After the Pathankot terror attack we again find ourselves to be on the receiving end in another round of proxy war imposed upon us by Pakistan. However, the old narrative on Pakistan continues to be prevalent in India though many presumptions on which it is based simply don’t add up.

Indian national discourse on Pakistan is based on many suppositions, assumptions, conjectures and surmises which do not match up with our past and present experiences. This article is not about making out a case against talks with Pakistan. It is an appeal to be realistic about Pakistan and accept it as it is and deal with it as it is instead of being wishful about it.

1. Terror during the Talks – It is widely understood that terror attack on Pathankot Air Base happened because PM Modi reopened talks with Pakistan. There is no direct evidence to prove this except an assumption that the Pak Army and its proxies like Hafiz Saeed and Maulana Masood Azhar don’t want good relations between the two countries. If we extend this logic, PM Modi should not have visited Afghanistan either to prevent attack on Indian Consulate in Mazaar-e-Sharif as there is wide consensus in Pakistan against good Indo-Afghan relations. The harsh reality is that such attacks have always happened no matter whether India was talking to Pakistan or not. Terror attacks do not necessarily happen during India-Pak dialogue to break it. Such attacks happen because war by terrorism is the primary leverage Pakistan has against the Indian State. The game works like this: First, Pakistan tries to push India into talks by harassing it through terror attacks and ceasefire violations. The peace lobby in India which is unable to contemplate any scenario between absolute war and absolute peace with Pakistan and is ostensibly more concerned about India’s economic development than ordinary Indians raises a hue and cry. Ultimately Indian Government of the day agrees to open talks.

And as the Indian political and bureaucratic leadership sits for negotiations, Pakistan unleashes another deadly phase of terror attacks, this time to extract a deal by inflicting unaffordable collateral damage which essentially involves popular backlash against the Indian government of the day as ordinary Indians find it incapable of protecting human lives and the national pride.

Pakistan thinks that a harassed and helpless Indian Government will yield to at least some of its demands. Even if that does not happen it will contribute to making party in power less popular and hence the Government of the day more insecure and unstable. It’s a nasty game of bullying and subversion.

And Pakistan has had near successes in this game. By harassing Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh governments through these tactics, Pakistan almost got them to endorse the so called ‘Musharaff Formula’ which requires India to give up its claim on Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and vacate the Siachen Glacier.

Given Pakistan’s well known record of never honoring written agreements it signed with India, it would have been start of another phase of the Kashmir dispute and not the end of it as once Pakistan legally gets 1/3rd Kashmir, it can still continue the proxy war and fuel internal unrest in the rest of it. Now, Pakistan is trying the same game with the Modi Government as it has been assertively claiming POK and also giving some ear to the plight of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.

Harsh reality is that Pakistan never turns off the terror tap. Talk to Afghans, they will tell you. Last year, Pakistan hosted the Murree talks between Afghan government and Afghan Taliban. These talks were preceded and succeeded by horrific terror attacks in Afghanistan by the Afghan Taliban.

Last month, when Pakistan hosted the Heart of Asia Summit on Afghanistan (which was also attended by India’s Minister of External Affairs Mrs. Sushma Swaraj), its proxy Afghan Taliban carried out majestic suicide attacks on the Kandahar Airport. Afghan Intelligence Chief Rahamatullah Nabil felt so betrayed that he vented out his frustration about Pakistan double games on his Facebook page before resigning from his job.

Fact is that Pakistan wages a relentless sub-conventional war against its financer USA as well as against India and Afghanistan. It is Pakistani way of bullying these countries into accepting the deal they are offering. Pakistanis are confident that one day they will succeed.

2. We can’t change neighbours– This is the catch line of reopening talks with Pakistan and the rationale of case for uninterrupted dialogue with Pakistan. No I am not making a case for no talks with Pakistan. But the problem is that every time we repeat this line publicly, we actually acknowledge that we either have no other options (and thus helpless before Pakistan’s terror onslaught) or we lack will power to exercise the other options. We go to talks with Pakistan with ‘No Other Options’ placard. So, Pakistan does not even take our polemic seriously; neither when we talk nor when we do not talk.

Then there is another problem with the “we can’t change neighbors” line of thought. It basically lacks strategic, historical and futuristic imagination. We did change neighbors in 1971. And the bigger question we need to ask ourselves is what we will do if our neighboring country itself changes for more bad. Pakistan is becoming a more radicalized society with each passing day; it has a booming small nuclear weapons program (to which terrorists may get access one day) and aggravating secessionist movements. Are we prepared to handle the contingencies if nightmares about Pakistan turn into reality?

3. Pak Army does not want talks with India- Actually there are times when Pak Army does want talks with India. Wasn’t General Musharraf all the time trying to have talks with India particularly after Operation Parakram? Recently, when PM Modi and PM Nawaz Sharif decided to engage with each other, Pakistan’s military complex was in the line of fire from international media as the San Bernardino attack (first by ISIS ideologues on US soil) was traced back to Islamabad’s Red Mosque which Pak Army had claimed to have cleansed of Jihadists long ago. Soon, international media’s focus got diverted to breakthrough between India and Pakistan. Talks with India also sometimes help Pak Generals to portray themselves as responsible guys. For instance, in the present scenario; it may help them to rescue the proposal of US-Pak civil nuclear deal out of the taboo zone. Generals also look forward to again propose the “Musharraf Formula” to Indian political class as a cure for its Pakistan migraine.
4. Nawaz Sharif is great friend of India– This myth was floated by Americans in the immediate aftermath of Kargil war to help India get out of intense feeling of betrayal. According to this story (widely assimilated by Indians), Gen Musharraf kept Nawaz Sharif in dark about the Kargil infiltration and he genuinely wanted to pursue peace with Vajpayee.
So according to this theory there was a good guy in Pakistan who did not want to do that to India. Tune into any TV Debate or open any Newspaper, you will be told that Nawaz Sharif wants peace with India but Pak Army is not allowing him to have his way.
This narrative ignores many insider accounts which tried to inform us about Nawaz Sharif’s double games with India. For instance, in his recent book “Where Borders Bleed: An insider account of India-Pak relations”, former Indian Consul General in Karachi, Ambassador Rajiv Dogra described how Nawaz Sharif was aware of the fact that Pakistani soldiers had already occupied Kargil heights when he was welcoming PM Vajpayee to Lahore.
The same book also claims that as Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif had approved 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai. In 2013, Vajpayee’s Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh told PTI that “I do not think a Prime Minister [Nawaz Sahrif] can remain unaware”. Bruce Riedel who was present in one on one meeting in Washington between President Bill Clinton and PM Nawaz Sharif on July 4, 1999 notes in his book “Avoiding the Armageddon” that when confronted and threatened by Clinton, Nawaz Sharif “reluctantly” agreed to withdraw troops from Kargil, knowing “he would be castigated at home for giving up Pakistan’s territorial gains with nothing to show for it.”
He would later be removed when he tried to shift the blame of Kargil debacle on his Army Chief. Actually, if Pak Army had succeeded in Kargil, Nawaz Sharif would have readily claimed the credit of victory. In anInterview, a Pak Army whistleblower Lt. Gen Abdul Aziz claimed that Nawaz Sharif wanted to know when the Pak Army “gifting him Kashmir”.
Nawaz Sharif was not going to ask a winning Pak army to withdraw from Kargil for the sake of friendship with India. He had to announce withdrawal for multiple reasons: Pak Army was loosing, Indians were threatening to give up self-imposed restraint, Indian Navy had adopted aggressive postures in Arabian Sea, Americans threatened sanctions and Chinese left Pakistan in cold.
Sharif tried to cover up his double game and tried to make General Musharraf and his Lieutenants scapegoats and got toppled in the process. Musharraf blamed Nawaz Sharif of betraying the Pak Army. A victim of his own double game with India became a subject of Indian sympathy.
And here lies another big problem. Nawaz Sharif can’t afford to be seen as yielding to India. He is damn careful about that. After PM Modi’s Lahore trip, Pak Foreign Secretary took great pains to explain how PM Modi invited himself to Lahore.
Recently, Nawaz Sharif wrote an open letter of support to Kashmiri Islamist Asiya Andarabi. Asiya Andarabi has been in news for addressing Hafiz Saeed’s rally over phone. Last month three potential ISIS recruits from India’s Hyderabad were nabbed when they were going to board a flight to Srinagar where Asiya was going to put them in direct contact with ISIS commanders.
Leaving all this aside even if we are to go by the popular narrative that Nawaz Sharif wants peace but is powerless, the next question that naturally crops up is if he is powerless what goods he can deliver? And if is not all that powerless then isn’t he complicit at least by way of omissions?
5. Civilian versus Military Leadership-According to this popular Indian narrative Pakistan’s civilian and military leaderships have conflicting interests and they are not on the same page on foreign policy issues. However, reality may be a bit more nuanced. Off course no civilian Prime Minister wants himself to be toppled and imprisoned by Generals but that does not make him a great friend of India by default.Firstly, if the civilian leadership portrays itself to be soft on India, it will be weakening itself.
   Secondly, except the 1999 coup whereby Nawaz Sharif was toppled there was no India factor in whatever happened to the civilian leaders of Pakistan. It was mostly their internal political dynamics.
   Thirdly, the civilian leadership in Pakistan belongs to the feudal elite class which was at the forefront of Muslim League’s Pakistan movement. These civilian leaders are not at all interested in so advanced a democratic system which destroys the feudal turfs on which they thrive. So, they too have some convergence of interests with the military deep state.
   Even a cursory glance at the career of most Pakistani Civilian leaders including that of Late Benazir Bhutto makes it clear that anti-India rhetoric and conspiracies have been their favorite pursuits and they were always counting upon ISI’s proxy war against India to extract something on Kashmir.
   However, there is utter confusion in India on this issue. When there happens to be Army rule in Pakistan, we say that it will be easier to deal with a democratically elected government. When such a government comes to power, we say it is powerless and it would have been easier to deal with a General.
   More interestingly, the assumption that the civilian and military leaderships are not on the same page is extended only to Pakistan’s policy towards India. You will never hear anyone suggest that PM Nawaz Sharif and General Raheel Sharif are not on the same page regarding Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy, whereby it wages another deadly war by means of terrorism.
   6. Economic relations will help check terrorism– According to a school of thought in India, if India somehow succeeds in upgrading its economic relations with Pakistan, we will get a leverage which will be helpful in ebbing the tide of India centric terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil.
   However, before believing all this there is a need to understand the psyche of Pakistan’s rulers and how Pakistan as a Nation sees itself. In his recent exhaustive and seminal work on the Partition historiography, “Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam and the Quest for Pakistan in Late colonial North India”, Prof Venkat Dhulipala notes that “it [Pakistan] was not just envisaged as a refuge for the Indian Muslims, but as an Islamic utopia that would be harbinger for renewal and rise of Islam in the modern world, act as the powerful new leader and protector of the entire Islamic world and, thus, emerge as a worthy successor to the defunct Turkish Caliphate as the foremost Islamic power in the twentieth century”.
   So, Pakistan was primarily conceptualized as a Nation State with a pan-Islamic mission and everything including economics comes next. In 2008, Start for author George Freidman noted that Pakistan is “modern day remnant of Muslim rule over medieval India”.
   And what were the Mughal rulers of Delhi trying to do all the time at great cost of human lives and money? They were trying to capture Afghanistan and expand into whatever was out of their domain in India.  They failed again and again but never stopped sending new armies to conquer Kabul and south India and ultimately ended up weakening and finishing their own empire.
   Pakistan’s rulers see themselves as their proud legatees. They all the time try to capture Afghanistan as well as expand into India through Kashmir. And for that they are ready to afford the unaffordable cost of nurturing the Jihadist forces which are also ruining Pakistan.
   The whole world has tried to explain to Pakistani rulers how this war by means of terrorism is ruining them and their nation but they never heed these sane counsels.
   If something does not fit into Pakistan’s religious-strategic revivalist theories, its economic rationale doesn’t matter much. If it does even the losses are welcome. So, Pakistan is happy with China despite the fact that Chinese exporters have ruined Pakistani exporters simply because Chinese diplomatic and military backing helps Pakistan in pursuing its dreams and wage proxy wars.
   Pakistan sponsors Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network who kill American soldiers in Afghanistan despite knowing that only Americans give Pakistan economic “grants” (even Chinese have declined) and help it secure finances at International monetary institutions.
   Let’s consider the case of TAPI Project about which Pakistan is making all the good noises. Project will not be financially viable unless India joins it and Pakistan suffers from acute energy crisis. But once India joins it and becomes a bit dependent upon supplies, Pakistan can exploit the opportunity through its proxies.
   Let’s not forget how Pakistan’s proxies burnt NATO supply trucks passing into Afghanistan through Pakistani territory (for this transit route Pakistan draws bills on NATO) whenever US tried to be tough with Pakistan. This does not mean that India should not explore such economic opportunities but expecting that such projects will give us some leverage over Pakistan which will make it roll back its proxy war against us is expecting too much.
   7. Dossier Diplomacy– After 26/11, India embarked upon what came to be known as the dossier diplomacy which involved supplying Pakistan with evidence about the involvement of Pak proxies and Pak intelligence officers in the 26/11 carnage. It was like giving evidence to a ganglord against his gang members and expecting him to punish them. It placed Pakistani State in the seat of a Judge in a prosecution where it was itself an accused.
   Under intense international pressure, Pakistan did institute a trial, arrested some members of LeT and placed some others in preventive detention. Many are already out on bail and trial is most likely to collapse as bizarre things are happening in the trial court.For instance, last month, a hostile prosecution witness told the Court that Ajmal Kasab is alive and may be produced in the Court! Pakistan banned Lashkar e Taiba and Jaish e Mohammed after attack on the Indian Parliament.
   Today, the recruitment networks and operational capabilities of these terror groups are even more potent and their stock is higher in the Jihadist world. After the Pathankot attack we are again sharing evidence with Pakistan.
   PM Nawaz Sharif has promised to PM Modi to take “prompt and decisive” action against the perpetrators of the attack. But it is unlikely that this decisive action will go much beyond then rounding up some Jihadists, placing some under preventive detention and instituting a trial which ultimately may go nowhere.
   In the meantime, terror infrastructure will continue to thrive on Pakistani soil as before and terrorist threat to India will continue to persist. What we need to understand here is that counterterrorism is not necessarily about proving things to terror sponsors; it is more about knowing and acting upon what we know.
   8. American and Chinese Pressure– Despite trying both carrots and sticks with Pakistan, US has not been able to dissuade it from supporting Afghan Taliban and Haqqqni Network. So now with Pakistan’s help, it wants to make a deal with these groups whereby the democratic regime in Kabul somehow survives after US troops leave Afghanistan and Jihadist won’t be able to claim that they have defeated another Superpower.
   Pakistan enacts a drama and says it will get the deal done but Washington should extract some concessions for it from New Delhi. This is the genesis of much talked US pressure (I would prefer the word persuasion as US-India mutual stakes in international politics are so high now that US can’t pressurize India in the manner it could have done 10 years back).
   Indian leadership should ask Americans that if they can’t stop Pakistan from getting their own troops killed through its proxies, how India can rely upon their guarantees. Actually, the occasions on which Americans took our complaints seriously are the ones when we threatened to redress the wrongs done to us instead of obeying the American advice of being good boys.
   China’s case is quite similar though a bit more complex. It is fine with Pakistan waging a sub-conventional low intensity war with India. It wants Pakistan to act as a strategic drag which does not allow Indian horse to run too fast. But that’s it.
   China knows that if Pakistan does too much mischief and India responds with its full State power either covertly or overtly, Pakistan’s efficacy as a strategic drag may get severely corroded. So, Chinese always refused to help Pakistan in its direct wars with India-be it 1965,1971 or 1999 Kargil war- though during each of these wars Pakistan’s military or civilian leaders traveled to Beijing seeking help. Moreover, unlike Pakistan, Chinese do care about economics and there is lot of economics between India and China.
   The limited point is that unless we don’t learn to impose back crises instead of just patiently weathering the ones imposed on us, no one is going to take us seriously.
   9. Proxy War and Pakistan’s Comfort Zone– After defeat in Kargil War, Pakistan’s leaders- both civilian and military- know it in their bones that they can’t even win a limited war with India. So, all of them want talks.
   But they simultaneously continue to wage a proxy war against us to bully us into a deal and they carry out this sub-conventional war under the Nuclear Umbrella. US war college-trained generals fully understand that any kind of nuclear adventurism may finish Pakistan but they are also aware that Indians have missed the fact that an umbrella is not meant to hit.
   Pak generals want to carry on this proxy war from their low risk comfort zones because they know that we won’t invade their comfort zones. They sponsor a terror attack during talks with India and then say that the dialogue should not be interrupted because of that.
   We need to beat them at their own game. We should also respond to a terror attack during talks with both over and covert means and then say that such a response should not interrupt the dialogue as we are just acting against terrorists. As soon as India starts dragging Pakistan’s leaders into high risk zone they will learn to behave themselves. Until we don’t do that we will keep reeling under the Pakistani strategy of bleeding India through thousand cuts.

India’s Af-Pak policy: Risks and Opportunities

Dec 15, 2015, South Asia Monitor/ Indian Defence Review 

By Divya Kumar Soti

 

The Ufa Joint Statement issued by the prime ministers of India and Pakistan had envisaged a preliminary framework to address the issues of terrorism, ceasefire violations and to find out “ways and means” to expedite the 26/11 trial underway in Pakistan. At least some progress was to be made on these issues before India got ready to reopen the long-suspended composite dialogue. And then there was a red line repeatedly drawn by New Delhi that when Pakistan’s representatives visit New Delhi for bilateral talks, they should not meet the Hurriyat separatists.

 

But when the two National Security Advisors finally met in Bangkok on December 7, they discussed much more than terrorism, though their conclusions or what Pakistan promised to deliver on the issue of terrorism was not made public. There is still uncertainty over whether Pakistan has finally agreed to abide by the Hurriyat red line or Bangkok was chosen as the meeting venue to avoid discomfiture to both sides. At least Pakistan has not committed to the Hurriyat red line in public, and in the last few months Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has written letters to Hurriyat leaders promising support. Clarity on this point would have been beneficial from the Indian viewpoint given the fact that Pakistan’s representatives are likely to reciprocate External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s visit to Islamabad in the coming days, as opening of the composite dialogue has been announced by both sides.

 

It is also not clear how India has been able to capitalize upon Nawaz Sharif’s recent statement of “unconditional talks” with India given the fact that the NSAs discussed many things, including Jammu & Kashmir and not just terrorism, and the composite dialogue has been reopened -- which inadvertently leads to the connotation that Nawaz Sharif was basically declining to agree to the Indian position of “Let’s talk terror first”.

 

Ufa was a milestone for the fact that for the first time Pakistan was made to agree in writing to a framework which required it to first address Indian concerns over terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil before any meaningful composite dialogue can happen.

 

But now the Narendra Modi government seems to have concluded that either it is not feasible to enforce the Ufa framework or it is not in the larger national interest, given the larger regional geopolitical scenario to try to rigorously enforce that strict framework as that may inevitably mean no engagement with Pakistan.

 

There are understandably many reasons for this conclusion: Firstly, Prime Minister Modi has to visit Pakistan next year for the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) summit. SAARC’s progress has always been dismal and India-Pakistan tensions have been a key reason for that. And this time there are India-Nepal tensions too. It is no coincidence that New Delhi has also started some proactive efforts to cool down the Nepal situation.

 

Secondly, Pakistan has got at east two shots in the arm during the latest US visits of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief General Raheel Sharif.  The Barack Obama-Nawaz Sharif Joint Statement bestowed upon Pakistan the accolade of “regional strategic stabilizer”. General Raheel Sharif during his self-invited visit to the US was pampered by the Obama administration, and it took care not to nudge the Pakistan’s military boss on anything. Despite figuring out Pakistan’s evident double games in the past as well as its glaring inabilities and unwillingness to stabilize the democratic regime in Afghanistan, US policy makers have not been able to figure out any new approach to the Afghan conundrum except repeating the pandering rituals before the real rulers of Pakistan, who also happen to be the real trouble makers in Afghanistan. This exceptional but seemingly unending US perplexity gives elbow room to Pakistan to do what it aims to do in the region by keeping Kabul and Washington on the tenterhooks through its proxies and affecting change in Indian policies towards it by capitalizing upon the US “reliance” on it for wishful stabilization of Afghanistan. In the coming days, the new fallout of all this may be that Pakistan will find it more easy to leverage its nuisance value at SAARC.

 

This leaves the Modi government with no option but to work on a hyphenated Af-Pak policy, given the fact that Af-Pak is now setting up the dynamics of China-US equations more than ever before. Before India opened up composite dialogue with Pakistan in the backdrop of the Heart of Asia summit to contemplate upon the future of Afghanistan, it also started to make operational the bilateral security agreement with Afghanistan, which in the coming days will involve transfer of sophisticated lethal weapon systems to the Afghan military which is now fighting not just Taliban but also the local Daesh (IS).

 

The Unending Endgame

 

The Murree process in which the Obama and Ashraf Ghani administrations invested a lot of hope due to guarantees from Beijing collapsed within days as news of Mullah Omar’s killing in 2013 by the Mansour faction broke, and three leaders at the helm of Taliban’s political office in Qatar staged a revolt. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) tried to restore the balance of power within the Taliban by introducing Sirajuddin Haqqani as second-in-command, but now there are multiple reports of Mullah Mansour being injured in internecine fighting to take revenge for the killing of a key dissident commander by his men. This latest internecine fighting erupted within days of Prime Minister Sharif’s announcement to re-launch efforts to broker peace between Kabul and Taliban. But the irony that haunts credibility of Pakistan is that when Taliban happens to be strong, ISI tries to have the whole cake in Afghanistan through Talibani terror campaign and tries to deliver it to the talks table when there is internecine fighting.

 

What is worse in all this is that Pakistan does not ensure even a lull in big attacks by the main faction led by Mansour and Haqqanis, though it happens to be in full control as it proclaims its peaceful intentions about Afghanistan. During Heart of Asia summit, where Pakistan again promised to deliver this main Taliban faction to the talks table, it attacked Kandahar airport killing many civilians. So rattled was the security establishment in Kabul over this Pakistani double game that the Afghan Intelligence Chief Rahmatullah Nabil went public criticizing President Ghani’s rapprochement with Pakistan, before resigning from his post. 

 

Given the churning within Taliban, there are lots of chances the ISI will try to do damage control within Taliban by affecting closer synchronization with the Haqqani network and introducing more disciplined groups like Jamaat ud Dawah into Afghanistan. For instance, last month, 41 boys from Pakistani tribal areas were killed fighting for the JuD and Al Badr in Afghanistan. This month the Afghan government officials in Nangarh province alleged that local Islamic State militants are getting order from Pakistan. This increased dependence of ISI on groups like JuD increases the terror threat to India in Afghanistan as well as back home. 

 

At this point, India should encourage the Ghani administration to open channels with Taliban leaders based in Gulf nations and Iran who want an Afghan-owned peace process. India may find support in these efforts from Gulf countries who are not happy with Pakistan over its refusal to participate in the Yemen conflict. While Gulf monarchies and Iran are on opposite sides in the Yemen conflict, both sides have allowed Taliban factions to operate from their territories. Further, as Iran and Russia are coming closer than ever before, both have interest in checking the growth of Islamist groups in north and west Afghanistan. India should explore all these avenues to the maximum. While the Mansur faction is still the largest, in view of increasing infighting even if a few key leaders can be won over by Kabul that will have a great symbolic effect.

 

So far, Pakistan has failed to deliver peace in Afghanistan. It will not do anything to strengthen the elected Afghan government which is now struggling against the dual threat of Taliban and Islamic State. This legitimizes India increasing its role in Afghanistan -- from being a reconstruction partner to a long-term nodal sustainer of democratic regime as the West cannot perpetuate its military presence for all time to come. In immediate terms, this is further justified by the fact that India has opened composite dialogue with Pakistan despite no progress on terror related issues to help promote larger regional stability.

 

From a bilateral viewpoint, squandering away gains of Ufa is a big price for India. The sustainability and final outcome of the new composite dialogue with Pakistan are as uncertain as those of previous ones. However, if India can capitalize upon opportunities in the larger Af-Pak scenario, it will still be a gainer in the long term.

 

Mullah Omar’s death: Pakistan’s pursuit of Strategic Stake to continue?

South Asia Monitor (Aug 12, 2015)

What Mullah Omar's death means for Jihadist world and Pak's new policy of "Strategic Stake" in Afghanistan. Read Here

Modi-Sharif Meeting:New benchmarks but caveats remain

South Asia Monitor (In focus) (Jul 14, 2015)

Read why absence of the term "composite dialogue" from Ufa Joint Statement is more important that the absence of word Kashmir, how Modi Government played safe at Ufa and how threshold of negative conduct by Pakistan stands lowered. Read full article here

Indian makes a smart move in Central Asia (South Asia Monitor: Apr 23, 2015)

Good ‪#‎economic‬ relations with ‪#‎Turkmenistan‬ allows India to tap into Central Asia’s rich natural resources where it can also act as a major balancing factor between competing powers like ‪#‎Russia‬, ‪#‎China‬ and ‪#‎US‬.  Iran is the only secure and stable gateway for India to trade with Central Asia, and Turkmenistan has the potential to form the next link in the strategic chain. Read More

Afghan peace process: Marred by short-sightedness (South Asia Monitor: March 12, 2015)

"The new peace process conceived by President Ashraf Ghani ultimately aims at reaching a power sharing deal with the Afghan Taliban. This latest peace process is as superficial as the previous ones because it does not demand an ideological course correction from Taliban. The Afghan Taliban remains committed to ultra-radical version of Deobandi Islam and had championed a barbaric medieval theocratic state in Afghanistan during its days in power where public flogging, stoning, beheadings and iconoclasm were perpetrated by the state machinery. Today the Islamic State is repeating just that in Iraq and Syria."

"The importance of such an ideological declaration is evident from the experience of Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood. Though the Muslim Brotherhood had renounced the use of violent means to achieve political ends as early as 1949 and was a key participant in the Tahrir Square agitation against the Hosni Mubarak regime, when it came to power after participating in the 2012 presidential elections it was soon found trying to impose an Islamist Constitution and its members were found to be indulging in attacks on Christians and other minorities. Leading Middle East expert Yasmine El Rashidi described this as an “Islamist Coup”. Soon Egypt’s powerful military had to intervene to save the country from plunging into utter chaos. All this happened because despite giving up violence and participating in the electoral process, the Muslim Brotherhood remained ideologically committed to the cause of establishing a theocratic Islamist State." Read Full Article Here

Islamic State arrives in Pakistan: Implications for South Asia (South Asia Monitor: Dec 14, 2014)

Article discusses Islamic State's alliances with groups like Jundullah (Pakistan), prospects of more jehadists swearing allegiance to Islamic State, challenges IS alliances pose on tactical level and evolving threat to India and Iran. Read full article here

South Asia Monitor: India needs to up its stakes in Central Asia

India needs to have Special Forces presence in Central Asia and there is a need to expand Central Asian Strategic Corridors to ensure a stable Afghanistan. Read More Here

A Twist in the Middle-East Tale

By talking over phone President Obama and Iran’s newly elected President Rouhani may have started to spell the new equations which have the potential of simplifying the extremely complicated geo-politics of middle-east. This historic rapprochement between West and the Iran will have long-term soothing effect on highly volatile situation in post-Arab spring era.

An acrimonious relationship with Iran makes US devote much of its energy in Middle-East to futile activities which do not help any of its long-term strategic goals nor do in any way contribute to global security scenario. George Bush’s inclusion of Iran to “axis of evil” phraseology only complicated and delayed US war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and thereafter Iraq in 2003, a hemmed Iran naturally found itself vulnerable. Washington’s hostile attitude further worsened the situation and allowed radicals in Iran to rise to power.

Iran had a stake in toppling of Taliban regime in Afghanistan which was extremely hostile to Iranian interests. When Taliban came to power in Kabul in 1996, it made all attempts to curtail Iranian influence in Afghanistan. Large scale selective killings of Shias were organized by the Taliban government. Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif was attacked and ten Iranian diplomats were killed. Iran had to amass 300,000 troops on its border with Afghanistan threatening to punish the Taliban regime.

However, Bush’s axis of evil rhetoric forced Iran to covertly help the Taliban after post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan by US so as to keep US military engaged and stretched. Similar things also transpired in Iraq. Saddam Hussein was Iran’s sworn enemy but after fall of Saddam regime Iran had to initially work at cross-purposes to US to keep US forces at bay. Things stabilized in Iraq only after Washington realized that a head on approach against Iranian clients will not be helpful. Ultimately Iranian covert co-operation in quelling the violence allowed US to withdraw its troops from Iraq.

Withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan which is scheduled next year will bring back things to per-9/11 era. There will be no substantial US military presence either in Iraq or Afghanistan. On the other hand, Iran will be faced with a resurgent Al- Qaeda on its west in Iraq which aims to push that nation into civil war and a hostile Taliban which will try to destabilize Afghanistan staking claims to power in Kabul to its East. All this has serious implications for Iranian interests in the region.

A glimpse of approaching turbulence is already visible. Pakistan’s tribal areas witnessed some of the most ghastly attacks mounted on Shias ever. At the same time, a terrorist group named Jundullah founded by Abdul Malik Rigi, who was a former Taliban commander and operates from Pakistani territory sprung into action after many years and killed sixteen Iranian border guards. In Iraq, Al-Qaeda’s activities are recording an exponential increase.

After UN sponsored chemical weapons deal with Assad regime, Iranian and US priorities are changing fast bringing them into cohesion. Going forward Washington will be increasingly focused on checking resurgence of Al-Qaeda and allied groups in the Islamic world. Similarly, these groups are emerging as greater threats to Iranian interests in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan than the West.

Emergence of Qatar as Track Two Player and India's Afghanistan Policy

From hosting Doha talks between US and Taliban to covertly supporting rebels in Libya and Syria, Qatar has been trying to increase its clout in Islamic world by leveraging its strategic importance in Middle-East. Qatar houses US CENCOM and has world's third largest natural gas reserves. Though Washington has often came to war of words with Doha on Al-Zazeera, Qatar continues to be a country of increasing importance in its Middle-East policy.

Due to the efforts of Qatar's erstwhile emir ,who was described by a recent BBC report as "Middle-East's Kissinger", Doha has become a hub of track two diplomacy in Middle-East. Even in military terms, Qatar's importance has been increasing ever since Bush administration decided to vacate Saudi bases.

Ironically, Qatar gains wherever Saudis loose. Saudi relations with Taliban have been progressively deteriorating since 1998, when Mullah Omar went back on his promises of handing over Bin Laden to Saudis. Saudi attempts to broker peace in Afghanistan failed badly in 2008-09 because many Northern Alliance leaders as well as Taliban factions were not ready to accept Saudi mediation. All this helped Qatar to become Taliban's diplomatic patron and many Taliban representatives are now permanently stationed in Doha.

Qatar also backed Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt which has a history of bad relations with Riyadh. Saudi Royals have always seen Brotherhood as a potent political threat to their regime. Though with the toppling of Morsi government by Egyptian Army, Saudis are back in game, nevertheless, Qatar remains a key player in Egypt as at some point political rapprochement with Muslim Brotherhood is unavoidable for the new Egyptian regime and there are already voices from inside the new government criticising the Egyptian Army's high handedness in dealing with Brotherhood protests.  Furthermore, there are fears of Salafists and Al-Qaeda taking advantage of current situation in Egypt and echos are starting to come out of Washington with Senator McCain describing the toppling of Morsi regime as a "coup".

Though many analysts saw happenings in Egypt as an endgame for tiny Qatar's participation in heavyweight diplomacy, the above noted developments suggest otherwise. It is true that overthrowing of Morsi government by Egyptian Army was bit of a setback for Qatar which was in power transition mode, but Qatar's new Emir is smartly trying to salvage the situation by trying rapprochement with Riyadh.

After backing rebels in Libya, Qatar has also emerged as a key player in Syrian conflict and have been shrugging off US and Saudi concerns about shipping shoulder fired heat seeking missiles to Syrian rebels.

Qatar continues to have close contacts with other side of Islamic world and with its strategic location and petrodollars, it is likely to remain a track two hub in foreseeable future.

India has a strategic partnership with Qatar. Two countries had signed Defence Co-operation Agreement in 2008 which provides for close military co-operation and joint defence production. This partnership is important for Qatar as it seeks to diversify its dependence on US in military terms. New Delhi should try to revitalize its relations with Doha. India needs to come to terms with the prospective ground situation in Afghanistan after US troop withdrawal in 2014 and thus, shall keep open some sort of back channel with Taliban. What makes this track two channel even more necessary is the perception that India may have to face typical security situations in Afghanistan. The new Nawaz Sharif Government has close relations with Saudis and Saudis are also likely to play on Pakistani line as due to their unacceptability in Afghanistan they are left with little room for having independent choices. This situation may be utilized by India for its advantage in Afghanistan.

William Dalrymple’s Wrong Conclusions about Evolution of Pak Army’s Doctrine of “Strategic Depth”

Threats which Afghanistan and India have been facing over the last two decades emanate from Pakistan Army’s much debated and discussed Doctrine of "Strategic Depth". This strategic depth theory was conceptualized after Pakistan’s defeat in 14-days war with India in 1971 which resulted in East Pakistan becoming an independent nation as Bangladesh. At that time paranoia had engulfed Pakistan and it was feared that conventionally superior Indian Military could easily annihilate Pak Army and Air force and Indian Navy can easily blockade the Karachi port and choke or occupy Pakistan within few days. So, it was considered necessary to have a friendly government in Kabul which should be averse to any Indian influence and provide refuge to retreating Pak Army in event of an all out Indian Military onslaught so as to save it from annihilation and allow it to wage guerilla warfare against  Indian forces from mountainous regions of Afghanistan. This is the most widely marketed and accepted version of Strategic depth theory in West which made William Dalrymple in his recently published Brookings essay "A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India" argue that the roots of all instability in Af-Pak region lie in so called India-Pak proxy war which is supposedly underway in Afghanistan. However, as we shall see, this black and white analysis misses at least two third of the real story of birth and evolution of the concept of Strategic depth, both in theory as well as in practice. Let us examine those left out causes, namely, the Iran-Saudi Arabia Cold War and Pakistan’s own geopolitical ambitions which have the potential to sustain the instability in Af-Pak as well as the global terrorism even if India goes out of picture from Afghanistan.

Iran-Saudi Arabia Cold War in Af-Pak

The Iranian Shiite revolution of 1979 was seen as a threat by Saudi royal family which rules over regions with Shia majority. From 1980 onwards the apprehensions of Saudi Royals began to materialize when Iranian pilgrims started political activities during the Hajj ceremony. Saudis saw it as an attempt by Khomeini to replicate a larger Shia uprising in the Middle East. From 1981 onwards regular clashes between Saudi pilgrims and Saudi Police and escalation of sectarian tensions were witnessed during the Hajj ceremony. All this ultimately culminated in violent clashes between Saudi Police and Iranian pilgrims during Hajj ceremony on 31 July, 1987, which according to Iranian allegations left 400 Iranian pilgrims dead. After this event, Iranian spiritual leaders openly attacked the legitimacy of Saudi royal family’s rule. Khomeini publicly declared, “These vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back,” and announced that Mecca was in the hands of “a band of heretics.” Saudi royal family was described by his deputy Montezri as “a bunch of English agents from Najd who have no respect either for the House of God or for the pilgrims who are the guests of God.” Just as Jerusalem would be liberated from the “claws of usurping Israel,” Mecca and Medina would be liberated from the “claws of Al Sa‘ud.” All this intensified the already underway Saudi-Iranian cold war which soon spread to Afghanistan. After 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both Iran and Pakistan supported the anti-soviet insurgency but their support was divided on ethnic and sectarian lines. While Pakistan colluded with Saudi Arabia to create Pashtun Mujahideen who were indoctrinated through Wahabi Madarsas being run in Pakistan financed by Saudi Charities and thus obviously inimical to Shia Iran; Iran supported Tajiks and Hazaras. This divide survived even after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and after Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supported Taliban taking over Kabul in 1996 all attempts were made to minimize Iran’s sphere of influence. Selective killings of Shias were organized by the new Taliban government. In Bamiyan province alone around 5000 Shias were killed by Taliban. Iranian Consulate in Mazar-e-sharif was attacked and ten Iranian diplomats were killed. Iran responded by amassing 300,000 troops on its borders with Afghanistan and threatened to punish the Taliban regime.

The Saudi apprehensions about rise of Iran were shared by Sunni radicals in Pakistan who smelled the presence of a fifth column everywhere after 1971. Thus after 1979, the Shias were begun to be seen with suspicion in Pakistan. The Wahhabi radical version of Islam which was being propagated with Pakistani State patronage to indoctrinate the foot soldiers of “strategic depth” further fuelled anti-Shia sentiments in Pakistani society. Money flowing through Saudi Charities was used in raising anti-shia terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Saheba, to minimize Iran’s influence in Pak by organizing regular attacks on Shia community. The after math continues to play out in Afghanistan and Pakistan till today with suicide bombings of Shia processions and regular massacres in Shia localities.

Initial Practice of “Strategic Depth”

When Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan readily offered its services to CIA and Saudis. However, ISI’s aim was not just to throw out the Soviet Union from Afghanistan or counter Indian influence over Kabul. But at that time Pakistan lacked the capability of realizing the dreams of becoming a regional master. Pak was trying to recover from the shock of 1971 and General Zia was propagating radical Sunni Islam which was seen as the only binding force which would hold Pakistan together amid its growing contradictions. Those who could not be accommodated within this new theological model, namely Shias, Ahmadis and Balochs are to be contained through the strategic assets which this model produced. At that time, CIA would not allow opening of an India front as it will involve shifting of resources from Afghanistan towards India and thus affect the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan. So, ISI had to remain content with arming Sikh terrorist groups in Indian Punjab. Throughout the 80’s Pak Army kept its strategic aims subservient to those of US and Saudi Arabia and used the opportunity to acquire and develop credible nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis India.

Pakistan’s Geopolitical Ambitions: From Strategic Depth to Strategic Breadth

By the time Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, initial thesis of Strategic Depth theory was totally outdated. By 1986-87 Pakistan had successfully developed a nuclear weapon and had acquired credible delivery platforms. The fear of an all-out Indian invasion was fast vanishing from power corridors of Islamabad and Rawalpindi and was being replaced by a new confidence which emanated from the “victory” over a “super-power like Soviet Union.” However, Pakistani leaders and Generals continued to legitimize their policy of using terror organizations as an instrument of State policy internally as well as externally by referring to “Indian threat.” The Pak Army’s “strategic assets” being extremely zealous forces could not have been kept idle otherwise like lamp’s Jinni they could have very well end up consuming their own masters. So Pak Army which was by that time well settled in the nuclear saddle decided to divert freed up resources from Afghanistan towards India. The policy of Strategic depth was transformed to that of Strategic Breadth and object was to make Indian State succumb to bleeding through “thousand cuts.” The very fact that Pakistan decided to launch a militant onslaught towards India and did not changed this policy even when these terrorist depredations on Indian territory repeatedly bring two nations on brink of nuclear war is in itself enough an evidence that there was no fear of an Indian onslaught left and thus initial premises requiring the seeking of Strategic depth in Afghanistan had vanished. Pakistan was very well conscious of its newly acquired nuclear deterrence as well as the new international order. From 1990 onwards Strategic Depth Doctrine witnessed a complete transformation, its new objectives being- First, to keep Afghanistan under Pakistan’s sphere of influence and slowly transform it to status of a satellite state of Pakistan. This along with Pakistan’s nuclear capability put Pakistan on some sort of a geo-political throne. It was also helpful in managing the Pashtun nationalism which could have threatened Pakistan’s integrity. Pak Army through its proxies was able to realize effective control over Pashtun areas despite maintaining physical absence from these areas. Second, to serve Saudi interests in Afghanistan by containing Iranian influence through its proxies. This is well evidenced in Taliban’s actions against Iranian interests and Shias after it occupied Kabul. This policy was aimed to keep up the flow of Saudi money to Pak Army’s “strategic assets” which was particularly necessary in wake of ISI’s expanding adventures from Afghanistan to India and money flow from Washington drying up after Soviet withdrawal. Third, to usurp the whole of Kashmir by fuelling secessionism and cross-border terrorism. Fourth, to avenge the 1971 defeat by supporting terrorist attacks throughout India and thereby impair India’s economy and communal harmony.

  

Pakistan’s Policy post-9/11: Interim Adjustments

In post-9/11 scenario, Pakistan had to amend its Afghanistan policy in wake of American threats of being “bombed back to stone age” and “with us or against us” demarcation. However, this change in policy was full of inertia and was reluctantly affected under extremely onerous circumstances. As Gen Musharraf recalled in his autobiography that he conducted theoretical ‘war games’ and found that Pak Army had no chance if it continued to support Taliban and Al-Qaeda. So, the Afghanistan policy adopted by Pak Army after Soviet withdrawal was so dear to Pak Army that it contemplated confrontational scenarios with US before reluctantly giving up its support for Al-Qaeda and Taliban. However, not all Generals were on the same page as far as this policy shift was concerned. The delegation headed by then ISI chief Lt Gen Mahmood Ahmad which was sent to Afghanistan by Gen Musharraf on 16 Sep, 2001 to pressurize Mullah Omar to agree to hand over Osama Bin Laden to Americans reportedly advised Mullah Omar not to hand over Osama Bin Laden at all. Ten years later, Osama Bin Laden would be found by CIA in a Pak Army cantonment area in Abbottabad.

To minimize the damage ISI classified these organizations into three categories- First category consisted of the obedient assets which were ready to act in Afghanistan in accordance with Army’s new policy and did not seek to destabilize Pakistan, namely, Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network. Second category consisted of those who saw the new policy as a sell out to US and were not ready to fall in line and seek to convert Pakistan into a true Islamic state and started to carry out terror attacks inside Pakistan to achieve that end. Most pertinent illustration is that of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Operations were launched against these groups by Pak army. Third category consisted of groups which were to be employed against India, Iran and for domestic purposes, namely, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hijb-ul-Mujahideen, Jundullah and Sipah-e-Saheba etc. These continue to freely operate in Pakistan under ISI patronage and have filled the gap created by weakening Al-Qaeda. The most of vacant Al-Qaeda ranks are now filled with former operatives of these organizations.

Mullah Omar and other prominent Afghan Taliban leaders were sheltered in Quetta and together with Haqqanis who operate from North and South Waziristan, constitute biggest threat to the idea of a stable and progressive Afghanistan. The terrorist attacks against Pak Army constitute something which is known in intelligence parlance as “spill-over effect.” When you fill a large container with water and try to turn it around, water is bound to spill out.

Future Scenario after 2014 US withdrawal

After US military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, the situation in Afghanistan and the region will closely resemble that prevailing prior to 9/11. Afghan Taliban will be effectively controlling not less that 65% of rural Afghanistan. The only difference this time will be that Taliban will not be able to have a free run over major cities and confine legitimate regime to a meager territory in north like it did in 1996 due to a relatively strong Afghan Army backed by international community. Pak Army will try to come to a truce with Pak Taliban and will gradually call off it operations in Tribal areas in return of Pak Taliban stopping its attacks inside Pakistan. A lull in Pak Taliban attacks in Pak hinterland is being already witnessed. The new Nawaz Sharif government has good contacts in Pak Taliban and attempts are already underway for a ceasefire. This will mark de facto partition of Afghanistan on ethnic lines. Though this will also involve minimal physical control of Pak Army over Tribal Areas but the sense for now in Rawalpindi is that this has always been the case since British times and all through the life of Pakistan. Islamabad has always micro-managed Pashtuns by administering them regular doses fundamentalism and unleashing them against India and Afghanistan.

The changed situation will be utilized by Pak Army to re-direct terror groups against India. Terrorist violence has already begun to rise in Jammu & Kashmir and regular ceasefire violations are being reported along Line of Control (LoC) whereby Pak Army attempts to push infiltrators into India. There has been revival of faith in Pak Army about its policy of using terror groups as instruments of State policy as this has been successful against USSR as well as against US in Afghanistan. ISI seeks to overcome the spill-over effect at play in Pakistan by re-deploying these groups from Afghanistan to India. Moreover, starting from Zia era, Pak army has been nurturing these groups and its ranks now suffer from what may be termed as reverse indoctrination, open play out which came to surface when attack on Gen Musharraf was traced back to Pak Air Force Officers and retired ISI officers repeatedly visited tribal areas to co-ordinate Taliban operations. It is just wishful thinking that some open minded General with western leanings can change this character of Pak Army. Even General Kayani had to face some embarrassing moments during his nationwide tours to Army Cantonments explaining the security situation after Osama Bin Laden killing by US forces in Abbottabad.

With each passing day in office, distance between Gen Kayani and other Corps Commanders will be widening in seniority terms which will mean less effective coherence on policy matters. We have seen this transpiring during Gen Zia’s times as well as during Gen Musharraf’s reign. Another problem about guessing the true intentions of Gen Kayani is that most of the policy makers and analysts in West judge them from what he is saying and not from what he is actually doing. Since, General Kayani came into office, ISI’s support for Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network has become more bold and overt. The attacks carried out by these groups in Afghanistan have become more and more audacious. ISI has opted for such a flimsy deniability that worst attacks in Kabul have been easily traced back by US and Afghan intelligence to Haqqani-ISI linkages. Moreover, Gen Kayani’s public discourses after killing of Osama Bin Laden by US forces in Abbottabad, though invoking Pakistan’s sovereignty have been no less than mourning. ISI immediately laid hands over Dr. Shakil Afridi who was instrumental in providing necessary information to CIA for raid on Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad and despite immense pressure from highest levels of Obama Administration and Capitol Hill, Pakistan has repeatedly refused to release him. Terror infrastructure against India has been kept well-preserved. All these are clear pointers that Pak Army intends to revert to its policies of pre-9/11 era. Another point that is to be noted is that despite immense US military presence in Afghanistan and billions of dollars being given in aid to Pak, Pak Army has not complied with US strategic goals in Afghanistan and continued its support for Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network. In such a situation, it is nothing else but self-deception to assume that Pak Army will be working for a stable Afghanistan after US withdrawal in 2014. Doha talks with Taliban will only give acceptability and legitimacy to Taliban and it will only be pursuing its well known agenda after 2014. Af-Pak is going to be theatre of another phase of Saudi-Iran proxy war which is already intensifying since this Muharram. The magnitude of recent attacks on Shias in the region is fast catching up with those witnessed in Iraq.

The most unfortunate thing is that after more than a decade on international efforts, Af-Pak seems to be all set to be back to square one. This region will again be the haven in which Islamic fundamentalists will be taking refuge from all over the world and from which indoctrinated trained terrorists will be dispatched to create chaos across the world.