Patna Blasts: Result of failure to capitalise on Yasin Bhatkal's arrest

Investigations have uncovered Indian Mujahideen's hand behind Patna Serial Blasts. Bihar Police was successful in nabbing one planter Imtiaz. His interrogation revealed a larger IM module functioning in Bihar, Jharkhand and Eastern U.P. under Tahseen aleas Monu. Thaseen is considered right hand of IM's arrested operations's chief Yasin Bhatkal.

While following up on information revealed by Yasin Bhatkal, security agencies took action in South India and raided some IM safe houses, action against Darbhanga module was missing. Bihar Police never tried to interrogate Yasin Bhatkal who when he was arrested by security agencies was carrying out recruitment in Bihar.

It is now very clear that Bihar Police took no action on leads emerging from interrogation of Yasin Bhatkal. Bihar Police had also rubbished the theory that IM was behind Bodh Gaya blasts. However, Patna serial blasts closely follow the pattern of Bodh Gaya Blasts as like in latter numerous low intensity IEDs were detonated at Gandhi Maidan at quick succession.

Evidently, IM's Darbhanga Module continued its activities unabated even after Yasin Bhatkal's arrest. Investigation in Patna Serial is revealing names of newer recruits and IM's network in Jharkhand and East U.P.

Even on security side Bihar Police put up a very bad show. Bomb Disposal Squads worked in Safari Suits handling the IEDs bare handed without any gadgets. One bomb went off while cops tried to diffuse it. Unable to diffuse the rest, Police exploded them by putting them on fire.

Planters were able to lace a bomb just 80 feet from dais which means all security rings made by Bihar Police were breached. Police has not been able to fully sanitize the Gandhi Maidan even after 24 hours. 

How Infiltrators managed to retreat from Shala Bhata

In an interview with Hindustan Times, GOC XV Corps has admitted that his boys have neither recovered a single dead body nor any equipment belonging to infiltrators from inside the cordon area in Shala Bhata village in Keran Sector.

Though it was very clear since Oct 2 when for the first time Indian Army broke this news to the nation, that Pakistani Border Action Team (BAT) was trying to break the Indian cordon to rescue the infiltrators trapped inside the cordon. I have dealt with this new tactic in detail in one of my previous posts.

But what constitutes a big surprise is the fact that Pak BAT seems to have been fully successful in its attempt to effectively engage and pierce the Indian cordon. This could not have been possible without a large scale rescue effort by Pakistanis supported by heavy ammunition support, exceeding the ceasefire norms thrust upon the Indian Army.

If one is to go by statements of GOC XV Corps it becomes clear that Pak BAT was repeatedly trying to "round up" the outer flanks of the cordon. This is a classic medieval technique having a guerilla element with Central Asian origins which has turned the tide of numerous battles fought over last ten centuries in Indian sub-continent.  The peripheries of cordon touching the LoC made it further vulnerable.

But the key question relates not to the ability of Indian Army to deal with such situations but with political will. Our army is fully capable to deal with such tactics. But that requires aggressive tactical manoeuvring backed with clear political directions. The way Shala Bhata infiltration was kept pressed under the carpet for nine days to allow PM Manmohan Singh to meet Nawaz Sharif says everything. Another notable point is that any strong reaction from political leadership in India over Shala Bhata incident has been missing.

The peace at any cost policy will put Indian Army at a serious disadvantage in this cruel quest for domination along LoC. This will naturally have consequences for security environment in J&K as well as in larger strategic context as Pak Army is likely to progressively heat-up the LoC in run up to US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in order to redeploy its strategic assets returning fro Afghanistan.

Security Lessons from Westgate Attack

As gory details of massacre at Nairobi’s Westgate Mall conducted by Somalia’s Jehadist group Al-Shabab become clearer, vulnerability of neighborhood shopping centers to such carnage is more apparent than ever before.

Terrorist attack at Nairobi’s Westgate Mall repeats some lessons which 26/11 Mumbai attacks taught us for the first time but which are still to be fully assimilated by our security establishment.

We may sharpen the preventive capabilities of our intelligence agencies to best possible limits but still terrorists will be having one in a hundred chance. Even target hardening has its limitations in view of crystallizing patterns of trans-national urban terrorism. After Parliament attack in 2001, most of the terrorist attacks in Indian hinterland came against “soft targets”. In this vast nation it is impossible to guard each and every public place.

Most of the major shopping centers today have a security drill designed to stop plantation of explosives. Private security agencies guarding these establishments as well as local policemen are ill-trained and ill-equipped to deal with highly-trained gunmen attacks like those we witnessed on 26/11 and just a few days back in Nairobi.

In event of such attacks effectively engaging the gunmen within first hour of attack is essential to minimize the loss of life and property. This role essentially falls upon local Police force which is obviously the first one to reach the spot. Special counter-terrorism battalions like National Security Guards (NSG) come into the picture at a later stage.

Afghan cities like Kabul face many attacks like 26/11 and Westgate attack every year. But Afghan security forces have been successful in minimizing the civilian casualties in such attacks due to their ability to efficaciously engage the attackers at the outset of attack which leaves them with little time to cause civilian deaths and hostage taking.

State Police forces in India need to rise up to the challenges urban terrorism is posing. A compact Quick Reaction Team (QRT), well-trained and well-equipped to deal with such attacks should be deployed at every major urban centre so that attackers may be engaged and cornered quickly. In absence of such provisioning we remain vulnerable to a Westgate Mall type of carnage.

What transpired in cyber-space during Westgate mall seize also leaves us with clues to social media management in times of crisis like these and how alert netizens can play a very important role. As Al-Shabab started to live tweet the details of horrible selective massacre its operatives were conducting at Westgate Mall, alert Kenyan twitter users started reporting this to twitter administration which blocked Al-Shabab every time it came up with a new account. Four accounts of Al-Shabab were blocked during first 24 hours of the attack and two more were blocked in following days.

Assessment of Situation in Shala Bhata

India tried a tiny talk with Nawaz Sharif and is now faced with a tiny Kargil. From what we know now that is how we can define the situation in Shala Bhata in Keran. Indian troops are locked in a close fight with Pak special troopers from its notorious Border Action Team for the ninth day.

Though Infiltrators in Shala Bhata do not enjoy effective control but area is still far from being "secured" by the Indian Army.Most alarming thing coming out of the Press Conference of GoC XV Corps is that Pak BATs are constantly trying to break the Indian Army's cordon from Pakistani side which means a complicated situation.

This also explains in part as to how all this may have happened. The first batch of infiltrators crossing on 23rd September were effectively intercepted by the Indian army. It is very clear that more compact batches were pushed later and Indian cordon was engaged by Pak BAT. This is in contrast with previous experiences when infiltrators once pushed inside Indian territory used to be "abandoned".

However, this time Pak BATs are trying to attack and break through the Indian cordon on Indian side of LoC even on the ninth day. This indicates two things- first, infiltrators trapped inside Indian cordon are no ordinary infiltrators; second, Pakistani side has something more than a mere big infiltration attempt on their minds. This is not just another area domination attempt with tactical overtones but confrontational attitude with political undercurrents. To deal with such a situation some aggressive tactical manoeuvring by the Indian troops will be required. A clear political message is pre-requisite for that.