Thursday, January 28, 2016

26/11 trial: To save face, Pakistan will not admit Headley as approver

Jan 20, 2016, South Asia Monitor

By Divya Kumar Soti

 

After the Pathankot terror attack, India has once again shared evidence with Pakistan which points towards the involvement of terrorist groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in planning and executing the attacks on India from the Pakistani soil despite being banned in the government files there. Pakistan has also once again promised to cooperate. But, while all this happens, it will be instructive to look into what is happening in the 26/11 case in which India has already shared clinching evidence with Pakistan.

 

Last month, within a few hours of India's external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj's return to India from Islamabad where she had attended the Heart of Asia Summit and met Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the chief of Jamaat ud Daawah (JuD), Hafiz Saeed released a video on Twitter where he proclaimed that India won't be able to prove his and his organization's role in 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks till eternity. Hafiz Saeed's statement was clearly provocative, but given the manner in which the 26/11 trial is proceeding in Pakistan, his confidence may not be misplaced.

 

When Sushma Swaraj was still in Pakistan, a hostile government witness told Islamabad's antiterrorism court which is conducting the 26/11 trial that Ajmal Amir Kasab is alive. Yes you read it right, according to his testimony, Ajmal Amir Kasab, the only terrorist to be captured alive after the 26/11 attacks and who was hanged to death by India in 2012 is still alive and can be produced in the court.

 

This kind of absurd drama in the name of bringing perpetrators of 26/11 carnage to justice is underway in Pakistan for quite sometime now. This trial in Pakistan started almost around the same time when India instituted a trial in this case. In India, which is known for a sluggish judicial process, the trial was completed in less than four years and Ajmal Kasab's death sentence got confirmed by two appellate courts including the Supreme Court of India. Similarly, in US, trial against 26/11 conspirator David Coleman Headley was instituted in 2009 and was concluded in 2013 culminating in a sentence for 35 years of imprisonment. However, in Pakistan, this matter is still languishing in the lower court.

 

It is not so that every terror related trial in Pakistan takes so long to reach any conclusion. For instance, in case of Dr. Shakil Afridi who allegedly helped CIA in finding out Osama bin Laden at Abottabad, his property was immediately confiscated after his arrest and he was tried for high treason. In less than two years he was sentenced to 33 years of imprisonment. Pakistan did not yield despite international community's pressure to release Dr. Afridi.

 

Now, let us compare all this with 26/11 case to understand what lies ahead for the Pathankot trial in Pakistan. While Hafiz Saeed got released from the preventive detention within a few days, another key conspirator Lashkar Commander Sajid Mir was never arrested by Pakistani authorities. Some media reports over the last few years did suggest that Sajid Mir was detained for sometime but was released probably because he had previously served in Pakistani Army. 

 

Last year, another key conspirator Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi has been able to secure bail for himself. According to a BBC Report, during his stay in jail, Lakhvi had access to T.V. and Internet and was allowed to host numerous guests daily. Some media reports go as far as to claim that Lakhvi even fathered a child while being in Jail. After getting bail he is living at some "undisclosed location". Pakistan has plainly refused to share his voice samples with India saying that there is no such provision in its law. Pakistan has not banned the Lakhvi-led Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) despite immense international persuasion.

 

But amidst all this, a ray of hope has emerged. David Headley, the man who had reconnoitered the potential target sites in Mumbai for Lashkar-e-Taiba as part of the 26/11 conspiracy, has agreed to testify before the Mumbai Special Court, which is currently trying another accused Syed Zabiuddin Ansari aka Abu Jundal who was allegedly present in Lashkar's Karachi control room during the 26/11 attacks and was arrested in 2012. Headley's proposal to act as a Prosecution witness and approver in lieu of immunity from sentencing has been agreed upon by prosecutors and the court. During the trial in US Court in 26/11 case, Headley had pleaded guilty under the plea bargaining provisions of US Law and had spilled the beans in front of international media describing the role of key conspirators like Lakhvi as well as the roles of ISI officers- Major Iqbaal and Major Sameer (code names).

 

 

But what Headley told during the US trial or what he is going to tell the Indian court will not form part of the record of the antiterrorism court in Islamabad and the manner in which bizarre testimonies by hostile witnesses are being recorded, it is very much likely that either the accused will go scot-free from the Trial Court itself or will be acquitted by higher courts due to weak evidence. If there are lacunae in the evidence presented before the trial court, higher courts may not be able to do much as such higher courts do not sit to record evidence or give findings of facts. 

 

In such a scenario, Pakistani government can absolve itself of any responsibility by saying that it can't do much when Courts have acquitted the accused. The investigation by Pakistan's Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) is not up to the mark and multiple Indian dossiers handed over to Pakistan have repeatedly pointed out the various loopholes and parts of the conspiracy which have not been covered by the prosecution.

 

So, it becomes necessary that Pakistan admits Headley as an approver in its 26/11 trial. Headley is under a plea bargaining contract with the US government under which he had promised to tell the truth in US Court in return of exemption from life imprisonment. And thus, it will be extremely difficult for him to change his previous confessions given before the US Court. 

 

It will also be very difficult for Pakistan to dismiss Headley's past testimony given in the US Court because American citizens also lost their lives in 26/11 carnage and it will not be easy for Pakistan to question FBI's investigation and US Court’s judgment. It is because of this reason Pakistan has tried to ignore Headley and has never taken cognizance of what transpired in US trial. Despite Headley's detailed confession before the Chicago Court in 2011, Pakistan never tried to admit him to its own 26/11 trial.

 

India and US need to keep up the pressure upon Pakistan in 26/11 case. If the accused get acquitted in Pakistan, there will be question marks over the Pakistan policy of both the Indian governments that have been in power since the trial began. It is necessary to keep a sharp eye on the ground realities of Pakistan while engaging with it as that is the best way of minimizing risks which essentially get involved in Indo-Pak interactions.

The Fatal Flaw: Nine Points India Ignores about Pakistan

Jan 9, 2016, IndiaFact.Org
After the Pathankot terror attack we again find ourselves to be on the receiving end in another round of proxy war imposed upon us by Pakistan. However, the old narrative on Pakistan continues to be prevalent in India though many presumptions on which it is based simply don’t add up.
Indian national discourse on Pakistan is based on many suppositions, assumptions, conjectures and surmises which do not match up with our past and present experiences. This article is not about making out a case against talks with Pakistan. It is an appeal to be realistic about Pakistan and accept it as it is and deal with it as it is instead of being wishful about it.
  1. Terror during the Talks – It is widely understood that terror attack on Pathankot Air Base happened because PM Modi reopened talks with Pakistan. There is no direct evidence to prove this except an assumption that the Pak Army and its proxies like Hafiz Saeed and Maulana Masood Azhar don’t want good relations between the two countries. If we extend this logic, PM Modi should not have visited Afghanistan either to prevent attack on Indian Consulate in Mazaar-e-Sharif as there is wide consensus in Pakistan against good Indo-Afghan relations. The harsh reality is that such attacks have always happened no matter whether India was talking to Pakistan or not. Terror attacks do not necessarily happen during India-Pak dialogue to break it. Such attacks happen because war by terrorism is the primary leverage Pakistan has against the Indian State. The game works like this: First, Pakistan tries to push India into talks by harassing it through terror attacks and ceasefire violations. The peace lobby in India which is unable to contemplate any scenario between absolute war and absolute peace with Pakistan and is ostensibly more concerned about India’s economic development than ordinary Indians raises a hue and cry. Ultimately Indian Government of the day agrees to open talks.
And as the Indian political and bureaucratic leadership sits for negotiations, Pakistan unleashes another deadly phase of terror attacks, this time to extract a deal by inflicting unaffordable collateral damage which essentially involves popular backlash against the Indian government of the day as ordinary Indians find it incapable of protecting human lives and the national pride.
Pakistan thinks that a harassed and helpless Indian Government will yield to at least some of its demands. Even if that does not happen it will contribute to making party in power less popular and hence the Government of the day more insecure and unstable. It’s a nasty game of bullying and subversion.
And Pakistan has had near successes in this game. By harassing Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh governments through these tactics, Pakistan almost got them to endorse the so called ‘Musharaff Formula’ which requires India to give up its claim on Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and vacate the Siachen Glacier.
Given Pakistan’s well known record of never honoring written agreements it signed with India, it would have been start of another phase of the Kashmir dispute and not the end of it as once Pakistan legally gets 1/3rd Kashmir, it can still continue the proxy war and fuel internal unrest in the rest of it. Now, Pakistan is trying the same game with the Modi Government as it has been assertively claiming POK and also giving some ear to the plight of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.
Harsh reality is that Pakistan never turns off the terror tap. Talk to Afghans, they will tell you. Last year, Pakistan hosted the Murree talks between Afghan government and Afghan Taliban. These talks were preceded and succeeded by horrific terror attacks in Afghanistan by the Afghan Taliban.
Last month, when Pakistan hosted the Heart of Asia Summit on Afghanistan (which was also attended by India’s Minister of External Affairs Mrs. Sushma Swaraj), its proxy Afghan Taliban carried out majestic suicide attacks on the Kandahar Airport. Afghan Intelligence Chief Rahamatullah Nabil felt so betrayed that he vented out his frustration about Pakistan double games on his Facebook page before resigning from his job.
Fact is that Pakistan wages a relentless sub-conventional war against its financer USA as well as against India and Afghanistan. It is Pakistani way of bullying these countries into accepting the deal they are offering. Pakistanis are confident that one day they will succeed.
  1. We can’t change neighbours– This is the catch line of reopening talks with Pakistan and the rationale of case for uninterrupted dialogue with Pakistan. No I am not making a case for no talks with Pakistan. But the problem is that every time we repeat this line publicly, we actually acknowledge that we either have no other options (and thus helpless before Pakistan’s terror onslaught) or we lack will power to exercise the other options. We go to talks with Pakistan with ‘No Other Options’ placard. So, Pakistan does not even take our polemic seriously; neither when we talk nor when we do not talk.
Then there is another problem with the “we can’t change neighbors” line of thought. It basically lacks strategic, historical and futuristic imagination. We did change neighbors in 1971. And the bigger question we need to ask ourselves is what we will do if our neighboring country itself changes for more bad. Pakistan is becoming a more radicalized society with each passing day; it has a booming small nuclear weapons program (to which terrorists may get access one day) and aggravating secessionist movements. Are we prepared to handle the contingencies if nightmares about Pakistan turn into reality?
  1. Pak Army does not want talks with India- Actually there are times when Pak Army does want talks with India. Wasn’t General Musharraf all the time trying to have talks with India particularly after Operation Parakram? Recently, when PM Modi and PM Nawaz Sharif decided to engage with each other, Pakistan’s military complex was in the line of fire from international media as the San Bernardino attack (first by ISIS ideologues on US soil) was traced back to Islamabad’s Red Mosque which Pak Army had claimed to have cleansed of Jihadists long ago. Soon, international media’s focus got diverted to breakthrough between India and Pakistan. Talks with India also sometimes help Pak Generals to portray themselves as responsible guys. For instance, in the present scenario; it may help them to rescue the proposal of US-Pak civil nuclear deal out of the taboo zone. Generals also look forward to again propose the “Musharraf Formula” to Indian political class as a cure for its Pakistan migraine.
  2. Nawaz Sharif is great friend of India– This myth was floated by Americans in the immediate aftermath of Kargil war to help India get out of intense feeling of betrayal. According to this story (widely assimilated by Indians), Gen Musharraf kept Nawaz Sharif in dark about the Kargil infiltration and he genuinely wanted to pursue peace with Vajpayee.
  3. So according to this theory there was a good guy in Pakistan who did not want to do that to India. Tune into any TV Debate or open any Newspaper, you will be told that Nawaz Sharif wants peace with India but Pak Army is not allowing him to have his way.
    This narrative ignores many insider accounts which tried to inform us about Nawaz Sharif’s double games with India. For instance, in his recent book “Where Borders Bleed: An insider account of India-Pak relations”, former Indian Consul General in Karachi, Ambassador Rajiv Dogra described how Nawaz Sharif was aware of the fact that Pakistani soldiers had already occupied Kargil heights when he was welcoming PM Vajpayee to Lahore.
    The same book also claims that as Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif had approved 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai. In 2013, Vajpayee’s Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh told PTI that “I do not think a Prime Minister [Nawaz Sahrif] can remain unaware”. Bruce Riedel who was present in one on one meeting in Washington between President Bill Clinton and PM Nawaz Sharif on July 4, 1999 notes in his book “Avoiding the Armageddon” that when confronted and threatened by Clinton, Nawaz Sharif “reluctantly” agreed to withdraw troops from Kargil, knowing “he would be castigated at home for giving up Pakistan’s territorial gains with nothing to show for it.”
    He would later be removed when he tried to shift the blame of Kargil debacle on his Army Chief. Actually, if Pak Army had succeeded in Kargil, Nawaz Sharif would have readily claimed the credit of victory. In anInterview, a Pak Army whistleblower Lt. Gen Abdul Aziz claimed that Nawaz Sharif wanted to know when the Pak Army “gifting him Kashmir”.
    Nawaz Sharif was not going to ask a winning Pak army to withdraw from Kargil for the sake of friendship with India. He had to announce withdrawal for multiple reasons: Pak Army was loosing, Indians were threatening to give up self-imposed restraint, Indian Navy had adopted aggressive postures in Arabian Sea, Americans threatened sanctions and Chinese left Pakistan in cold.
    Sharif tried to cover up his double game and tried to make General Musharraf and his Lieutenants scapegoats and got toppled in the process. Musharraf blamed Nawaz Sharif of betraying the Pak Army. A victim of his own double game with India became a subject of Indian sympathy.
    And here lies another big problem. Nawaz Sharif can’t afford to be seen as yielding to India. He is damn careful about that. After PM Modi’s Lahore trip, Pak Foreign Secretary took great pains to explain how PM Modi invited himself to Lahore.
    Recently, Nawaz Sharif wrote an open letter of support to Kashmiri Islamist Asiya Andarabi. Asiya Andarabi has been in news for addressing Hafiz Saeed’s rally over phone. Last month three potential ISIS recruits from India’s Hyderabad were nabbed when they were going to board a flight to Srinagar where Asiya was going to put them in direct contact with ISIS commanders.
    Leaving all this aside even if we are to go by the popular narrative that Nawaz Sharif wants peace but is powerless, the next question that naturally crops up is if he is powerless what goods he can deliver? And if is not all that powerless then isn’t he complicit at least by way of omissions?
    1. Civilian versus Military Leadership-According to this popular Indian narrative Pakistan’s civilian and military leaderships have conflicting interests and they are not on the same page on foreign policy issues. However, reality may be a bit more nuanced. Off course no civilian Prime Minister wants himself to be toppled and imprisoned by Generals but that does not make him a great friend of India by default.Firstly, if the civilian leadership portrays itself to be soft on India, it will be weakening itself.
      Secondly, except the 1999 coup whereby Nawaz Sharif was toppled there was no India factor in whatever happened to the civilian leaders of Pakistan. It was mostly their internal political dynamics.
      Thirdly, the civilian leadership in Pakistan belongs to the feudal elite class which was at the forefront of Muslim League’s Pakistan movement. These civilian leaders are not at all interested in so advanced a democratic system which destroys the feudal turfs on which they thrive. So, they too have some convergence of interests with the military deep state.
      Even a cursory glance at the career of most Pakistani Civilian leaders including that of Late Benazir Bhutto makes it clear that anti-India rhetoric and conspiracies have been their favorite pursuits and they were always counting upon ISI’s proxy war against India to extract something on Kashmir.
      However, there is utter confusion in India on this issue. When there happens to be Army rule in Pakistan, we say that it will be easier to deal with a democratically elected government. When such a government comes to power, we say it is powerless and it would have been easier to deal with a General.
      More interestingly, the assumption that the civilian and military leaderships are not on the same page is extended only to Pakistan’s policy towards India. You will never hear anyone suggest that PM Nawaz Sharif and General Raheel Sharif are not on the same page regarding Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy, whereby it wages another deadly war by means of terrorism.
      1. Economic relations will help check terrorism– According to a school of thought in India, if India somehow succeeds in upgrading its economic relations with Pakistan, we will get a leverage which will be helpful in ebbing the tide of India centric terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil.
      However, before believing all this there is a need to understand the psyche of Pakistan’s rulers and how Pakistan as a Nation sees itself. In his recent exhaustive and seminal work on the Partition historiography, “Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam and the Quest for Pakistan in Late colonial North India”, Prof Venkat Dhulipala notes that “it [Pakistan] was not just envisaged as a refuge for the Indian Muslims, but as an Islamic utopia that would be harbinger for renewal and rise of Islam in the modern world, act as the powerful new leader and protector of the entire Islamic world and, thus, emerge as a worthy successor to the defunct Turkish Caliphate as the foremost Islamic power in the twentieth century”.
      So, Pakistan was primarily conceptualized as a Nation State with a pan-Islamic mission and everything including economics comes next. In 2008, Start for author George Freidman noted that Pakistan is “modern day remnant of Muslim rule over medieval India”.
      And what were the Mughal rulers of Delhi trying to do all the time at great cost of human lives and money? They were trying to capture Afghanistan and expand into whatever was out of their domain in India.  They failed again and again but never stopped sending new armies to conquer Kabul and south India and ultimately ended up weakening and finishing their own empire.
      Pakistan’s rulers see themselves as their proud legatees. They all the time try to capture Afghanistan as well as expand into India through Kashmir. And for that they are ready to afford the unaffordable cost of nurturing the Jihadist forces which are also ruining Pakistan.
      The whole world has tried to explain to Pakistani rulers how this war by means of terrorism is ruining them and their nation but they never heed these sane counsels.
      If something does not fit into Pakistan’s religious-strategic revivalist theories, its economic rationale doesn’t matter much. If it does even the losses are welcome. So, Pakistan is happy with China despite the fact that Chinese exporters have ruined Pakistani exporters simply because Chinese diplomatic and military backing helps Pakistan in pursuing its dreams and wage proxy wars.
      Pakistan sponsors Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network who kill American soldiers in Afghanistan despite knowing that only Americans give Pakistan economic “grants” (even Chinese have declined) and help it secure finances at International monetary institutions.
      Let’s consider the case of TAPI Project about which Pakistan is making all the good noises. Project will not be financially viable unless India joins it and Pakistan suffers from acute energy crisis. But once India joins it and becomes a bit dependent upon supplies, Pakistan can exploit the opportunity through its proxies.
      Let’s not forget how Pakistan’s proxies burnt NATO supply trucks passing into Afghanistan through Pakistani territory (for this transit route Pakistan draws bills on NATO) whenever US tried to be tough with Pakistan. This does not mean that India should not explore such economic opportunities but expecting that such projects will give us some leverage over Pakistan which will make it roll back its proxy war against us is expecting too much.
      1. Dossier Diplomacy– After 26/11, India embarked upon what came to be known as the dossier diplomacy which involved supplying Pakistan with evidence about the involvement of Pak proxies and Pak intelligence officers in the 26/11 carnage. It was like giving evidence to a ganglord against his gang members and expecting him to punish them. It placed Pakistani State in the seat of a Judge in a prosecution where it was itself an accused.
      Under intense international pressure, Pakistan did institute a trial, arrested some members of LeT and placed some others in preventive detention. Many are already out on bail and trial is most likely to collapse as bizarre things are happening in the trial court.For instance, last month, a hostile prosecution witness told the Court that Ajmal Kasab is alive and may be produced in the Court! Pakistan banned Lashkar e Taiba and Jaish e Mohammed after attack on the Indian Parliament.
      Today, the recruitment networks and operational capabilities of these terror groups are even more potent and their stock is higher in the Jihadist world. After the Pathankot attack we are again sharing evidence with Pakistan.
      PM Nawaz Sharif has promised to PM Modi to take “prompt and decisive” action against the perpetrators of the attack. But it is unlikely that this decisive action will go much beyond then rounding up some Jihadists, placing some under preventive detention and instituting a trial which ultimately may go nowhere.
      In the meantime, terror infrastructure will continue to thrive on Pakistani soil as before and terrorist threat to India will continue to persist. What we need to understand here is that counterterrorism is not necessarily about proving things to terror sponsors; it is more about knowing and acting upon what we know.
      1. American and Chinese Pressure– Despite trying both carrots and sticks with Pakistan, US has not been able to dissuade it from supporting Afghan Taliban and Haqqqni Network. So now with Pakistan’s help, it wants to make a deal with these groups whereby the democratic regime in Kabul somehow survives after US troops leave Afghanistan and Jihadist won’t be able to claim that they have defeated another Superpower.
      Pakistan enacts a drama and says it will get the deal done but Washington should extract some concessions for it from New Delhi. This is the genesis of much talked US pressure (I would prefer the word persuasion as US-India mutual stakes in international politics are so high now that US can’t pressurize India in the manner it could have done 10 years back).
      Indian leadership should ask Americans that if they can’t stop Pakistan from getting their own troops killed through its proxies, how India can rely upon their guarantees. Actually, the occasions on which Americans took our complaints seriously are the ones when we threatened to redress the wrongs done to us instead of obeying the American advice of being good boys.
      China’s case is quite similar though a bit more complex. It is fine with Pakistan waging a sub-conventional low intensity war with India. It wants Pakistan to act as a strategic drag which does not allow Indian horse to run too fast. But that’s it.
      China knows that if Pakistan does too much mischief and India responds with its full State power either covertly or overtly, Pakistan’s efficacy as a strategic drag may get severely corroded. So, Chinese always refused to help Pakistan in its direct wars with India-be it 1965,1971 or 1999 Kargil war- though during each of these wars Pakistan’s military or civilian leaders traveled to Beijing seeking help. Moreover, unlike Pakistan, Chinese do care about economics and there is lot of economics between India and China.
      The limited point is that unless we don’t learn to impose back crises instead of just patiently weathering the ones imposed on us, no one is going to take us seriously.
      1. Proxy War and Pakistan’s Comfort Zone– After defeat in Kargil War, Pakistan’s leaders- both civilian and military- know it in their bones that they can’t even win a limited war with India. So, all of them want talks.
      But they simultaneously continue to wage a proxy war against us to bully us into a deal and they carry out this sub-conventional war under the Nuclear Umbrella. US war college-trained generals fully understand that any kind of nuclear adventurism may finish Pakistan but they are also aware that Indians have missed the fact that an umbrella is not meant to hit.
      Pak generals want to carry on this proxy war from their low risk comfort zones because they know that we won’t invade their comfort zones. They sponsor a terror attack during talks with India and then say that the dialogue should not be interrupted because of that.
      We need to beat them at their own game. We should also respond to a terror attack during talks with both over and covert means and then say that such a response should not interrupt the dialogue as we are just acting against terrorists. As soon as India starts dragging Pakistan’s leaders into high risk zone they will learn to behave themselves. Until we don’t do that we will keep reeling under the Pakistani strategy of bleeding India through thousand cuts.

कार्रवाई या रस्म अदायगी (Action or Ritualism)

Jan 14, 2016, Dainik Jagran

पठानकेट एयरबेस में आतंकी हमले के लिए पाकिस्तानी सेना और उसकी खुफिया एजेंसी आइएसआइ ने इस बार आतंकी संगठन जैश-ए-मोहम्मद का इस्तेमाल किया था। भारत के दबाव के बाद इस आतंकी संगठन के सरगना मसूद अजहर और उसके कुछ साथियों को हिरासत में लेने की खबर है, लेकिन इतने मात्र से किसी ठोस नतीजे पर नहीं पहुंचा जाना चाहिए। जैश-ए-मोहम्मद 2001 में भारतीय संसद पर हुए आतंकी हमले का भी जिम्मेदार था। यह 2001 के बाद अफगानिस्तान में अमेरिकी सेना से लड़ रहे आतंकी गुटों की मदद करने में व्यस्त रहा। चूंकि इसका एक गुट तालिबान और अलकायदा के विरुद्ध अभियान में अमेरिका का साथ देने की परवेज मुशर्रफ की नीति के खिलाफ था इसलिए वह संगठन से अलग हो गया। इस गुट के कुछ नेताओं को मुशर्रफ की हत्या की साजिश रचने के आरोप में गिरफ्तार भी किया गया था, लेकिन बाद में वे रिहा हो गए। इस दौरान संगठन का मुखिया मसूद अजहर पाक सेना के प्रति वफादार बना रहा। भारतीय संसद पर हमले के बाद अंतरराष्ट्रीय दबाव में पाकिस्तान ने जैश-ए-मोहम्मद को प्रतिबंधित अवश्य किया, लेकिन यह सिर्फ अंतरराष्ट्रीय जगत को भ्रमित करने के लिए की गई कागजी कार्रवाई थी। इस संगठन की गतिविधियों पर आई अमेरिकी सरकार की रिपोर्ट के अनुसार प्रतिबंध के बावजूद वर्ष 2001 से 2013 तक जैश-ए-मोहम्मद खुलेआम जेहादी गतिविधियां चलाता रहा। इस संगठन का पांच एकड़ में फैला मुख्यालय पाकिस्तान के बहावलपुर में चल रहा है, जहां से वह जर्ब-ए-मोमिन नाम का एक अखबार भी निकालता है जिसका पाकिस्तान में एक अच्छा खासा पाठक वर्ग है। फरवरी 2014 में मौलाना मसूद अजहर ने पाकिस्तान अधिकृत कश्मीर के मुजफ्फराबाद में एक बड़ी रैली को संबोधित किया था जिसमें भारतीय संसद पर हमले की साजिश रचने वाले अफजल गुरु की किताब का विमोचन किया गया था। पाकिस्तान की सरकार ने स्वयं इस रैली की सुरक्षा का प्रबंध किया था।

पठानकोट हमले के बाद पाकिस्तान ने आतंकवाद के विरुद्ध एक बार फिर निर्णायक कार्रवाई का भरोसा दिलाया है, परंतु प्रश्न यह है कि हम निर्णायक कार्रवाई किसको मानेंगे? क्या आतंकी संगठनों पर सरकारी फाइलों में प्रतिबंध लगाना, कुछ आतंकियों को कुछ समय के लिए नजरबंद या गिरफ्तार करना और उन पर एक लचर मुकदमा दायर करने की रस्म अदायगी निर्णायक कार्रवाई मानी जा सकती है। पाकिस्तान द्वारा इस प्रकार की कार्रवाई संसद और 26/11 के मुंबई हमले के बाद भी की गई थी। क्या उस सबसे लश्कर और जैश जैसे आतंकी गुटों की भारत पर आतंकी हमले करने की क्षमता में कोई कमी आई?
कड़वी सच्चाई यह है कि 1993 के मुंबई बम धमाकों से लेकर 26/11 के हमलों तक भारत पर हुए आतंकी हमलों के गुनहगारों में से किसी एक को भी पाकिस्तान ने न तो कोई सजा दी है और न ही भारत के हवाले ही किया है। पठानकोट हमले के आरोपी आतंकियों पर कागजी कार्रवाई करने भर से भारत पर आतंकी हमले का खतरा कम नहीं होगा। यह खतरा तब तक बना रहेगा, जब तक पाकिस्तान में आतंकी ढांचा सुरक्षित है। पठानकोट एयरबेस में घुसे आतंकियों के विरुद्ध चले लंबे ऑपरेशन की काफी निंदा की जा रही है, लेकिन अगर इसकी तुलना पिछले कुछ वर्षों में अफगानिस्तान और पाकिस्तान के सैनिक ठिकानों पर हुए हमलों से करें तो पठानकोट में एनएसए अजित डोभाल के दिशा-निर्देशन में चलाया गया ऑपरेशन काफी हद तक सफल रहा। उदाहरण के लिए वर्ष 2011 में पहले से खुफिया अलर्ट के बावजूद पाक फौज के खिलाफ लड़ रहे संगठन टीटीपी के आतंकी पाक नौसेना के अड्डे में घुसकर अमेरिका से खरीदे गए बेहद महंगे विमान नष्ट करने में सफल रहे थे। काबुल में नाटो मुख्यालय पर हुए आतंकी हमले के दौरान अमेरिकी राजदूत को कई घंटों तक बंकर में रह कर जान बचाना पड़ी थी। पठानकोट में ऐसी स्थिति नहीं बनी, वरना देश का बहुत अपमान होता। बावजूद इसके आतंकी इस सामरिक एयरबेस में घुस पाए, यह चिंता का विषय है।
पिछले कुछ समय से सीमा पार से होने वाले आतंकी हमलों का दबाव जम्मू और पंजाब की ओर बढ़ रहा है। गत वर्ष 27 जुलाई को पंजाब के गुरदासपुर जिले के दीनानगर थाने पर पाकिस्तान के नारोवाल सेक्टर से घुसे आतंकियों ने हमला किया था। आइएसआइ की मदद से पंजाब के गुरदासपुर, फिरोजपुर, अमृतसर और राजस्थान के रायसिंहगढ़ एवं श्रीगंगानगर सेक्टर में चल रही नशीले पदार्थों और हथियारों की तस्करी के मामले प्रकाश में आते रहे हैं। घुसपैठ करने वाले आतंकी तस्करी के इसी नेटवर्क का इस्तेमाल करते हैं। सीमा पर मौजूद प्राकृतिक संरचनाओं और नदी-नालों के कारण हर जगह बाड़ लगाना संभव नहीं है। ऐसे में यह आवश्यक है कि सीमा की निगरानी करने वाली एजेंसियों को छोटे उन्नत मानवरहित टोही विमानों से लैस किया जाए, ताकि सीमा पर सतत निगरानी रखी जा सके।
दरअसल आतंक प्रतिरोधक ढांचे में मौजूद कुछ मूलभूत कमियों के कारण हम आतंक के समक्ष एक असहाय राष्ट्र बनकर रह गए हैं। आम दिनों में हम इस तरह का आचरण करते हैं जैसे हमारे देश को कोई आतंकी खतरा ही नहीं है। पठानकोट एयरबेस के चारों ओर प्रतिबंधित क्षेत्र में कई दुकानें चल रही थीं और कई खोमचे वाले व्यवसाय कर रहे थे, जबकि यह पूर्ण रूप से गैरकानूनी है। आम नागरिकों द्वारा इस्तेमाल की जाने वाली जगहों को आतंकी आसान निशाना समझते हैं, परंतु प्रशासनिक लापरवाहियों के कारण सैनिक और अर्धसैनिक ठिकाने भी आतंकियों के लिए आसान लक्ष्य बन चुके हैं। यही कारण है कि आतंकी खुफिया अलर्ट के बावजूद पठानकोट एयरबेस में घुस पाए।

India’s Af-Pak policy: Risks and Opportunities

Dec 15, 2015, South Asia Monitor/ Indian Defence Review 

By Divya Kumar Soti
 
The Ufa Joint Statement issued by the prime ministers of India and Pakistan had envisaged a preliminary framework to address the issues of terrorism, ceasefire violations and to find out “ways and means” to expedite the 26/11 trial underway in Pakistan. At least some progress was to be made on these issues before India got ready to reopen the long-suspended composite dialogue. And then there was a red line repeatedly drawn by New Delhi that when Pakistan’s representatives visit New Delhi for bilateral talks, they should not meet the Hurriyat separatists.
 
But when the two National Security Advisors finally met in Bangkok on December 7, they discussed much more than terrorism, though their conclusions or what Pakistan promised to deliver on the issue of terrorism was not made public. There is still uncertainty over whether Pakistan has finally agreed to abide by the Hurriyat red line or Bangkok was chosen as the meeting venue to avoid discomfiture to both sides. At least Pakistan has not committed to the Hurriyat red line in public, and in the last few months Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has written letters to Hurriyat leaders promising support. Clarity on this point would have been beneficial from the Indian viewpoint given the fact that Pakistan’s representatives are likely to reciprocate External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s visit to Islamabad in the coming days, as opening of the composite dialogue has been announced by both sides.
 
It is also not clear how India has been able to capitalize upon Nawaz Sharif’s recent statement of “unconditional talks” with India given the fact that the NSAs discussed many things, including Jammu & Kashmir and not just terrorism, and the composite dialogue has been reopened -- which inadvertently leads to the connotation that Nawaz Sharif was basically declining to agree to the Indian position of “Let’s talk terror first”.
 
Ufa was a milestone for the fact that for the first time Pakistan was made to agree in writing to a framework which required it to first address Indian concerns over terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil before any meaningful composite dialogue can happen.
 
But now the Narendra Modi government seems to have concluded that either it is not feasible to enforce the Ufa framework or it is not in the larger national interest, given the larger regional geopolitical scenario to try to rigorously enforce that strict framework as that may inevitably mean no engagement with Pakistan.
 
There are understandably many reasons for this conclusion: Firstly, Prime Minister Modi has to visit Pakistan next year for the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) summit. SAARC’s progress has always been dismal and India-Pakistan tensions have been a key reason for that. And this time there are India-Nepal tensions too. It is no coincidence that New Delhi has also started some proactive efforts to cool down the Nepal situation.
 
Secondly, Pakistan has got at east two shots in the arm during the latest US visits of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief General Raheel Sharif.  The Barack Obama-Nawaz Sharif Joint Statement bestowed upon Pakistan the accolade of “regional strategic stabilizer”. General Raheel Sharif during his self-invited visit to the US was pampered by the Obama administration, and it took care not to nudge the Pakistan’s military boss on anything. Despite figuring out Pakistan’s evident double games in the past as well as its glaring inabilities and unwillingness to stabilize the democratic regime in Afghanistan, US policy makers have not been able to figure out any new approach to the Afghan conundrum except repeating the pandering rituals before the real rulers of Pakistan, who also happen to be the real trouble makers in Afghanistan. This exceptional but seemingly unending US perplexity gives elbow room to Pakistan to do what it aims to do in the region by keeping Kabul and Washington on the tenterhooks through its proxies and affecting change in Indian policies towards it by capitalizing upon the US “reliance” on it for wishful stabilization of Afghanistan. In the coming days, the new fallout of all this may be that Pakistan will find it more easy to leverage its nuisance value at SAARC.
 
This leaves the Modi government with no option but to work on a hyphenated Af-Pak policy, given the fact that Af-Pak is now setting up the dynamics of China-US equations more than ever before. Before India opened up composite dialogue with Pakistan in the backdrop of the Heart of Asia summit to contemplate upon the future of Afghanistan, it also started to make operational the bilateral security agreement with Afghanistan, which in the coming days will involve transfer of sophisticated lethal weapon systems to the Afghan military which is now fighting not just Taliban but also the local Daesh (IS).
 
The Unending Endgame
 
The Murree process in which the Obama and Ashraf Ghani administrations invested a lot of hope due to guarantees from Beijing collapsed within days as news of Mullah Omar’s killing in 2013 by the Mansour faction broke, and three leaders at the helm of Taliban’s political office in Qatar staged a revolt. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) tried to restore the balance of power within the Taliban by introducing Sirajuddin Haqqani as second-in-command, but now there are multiple reports of Mullah Mansour being injured in internecine fighting to take revenge for the killing of a key dissident commander by his men. This latest internecine fighting erupted within days of Prime Minister Sharif’s announcement to re-launch efforts to broker peace between Kabul and Taliban. But the irony that haunts credibility of Pakistan is that when Taliban happens to be strong, ISI tries to have the whole cake in Afghanistan through Talibani terror campaign and tries to deliver it to the talks table when there is internecine fighting.
 
What is worse in all this is that Pakistan does not ensure even a lull in big attacks by the main faction led by Mansour and Haqqanis, though it happens to be in full control as it proclaims its peaceful intentions about Afghanistan. During Heart of Asia summit, where Pakistan again promised to deliver this main Taliban faction to the talks table, it attacked Kandahar airport killing many civilians. So rattled was the security establishment in Kabul over this Pakistani double game that the Afghan Intelligence Chief Rahmatullah Nabil went public criticizing President Ghani’s rapprochement with Pakistan, before resigning from his post. 
 
Given the churning within Taliban, there are lots of chances the ISI will try to do damage control within Taliban by affecting closer synchronization with the Haqqani network and introducing more disciplined groups like Jamaat ud Dawah into Afghanistan. For instance, last month, 41 boys from Pakistani tribal areas were killed fighting for the JuD and Al Badr in Afghanistan. This month the Afghan government officials in Nangarh province alleged that local Islamic State militants are getting order from Pakistan. This increased dependence of ISI on groups like JuD increases the terror threat to India in Afghanistan as well as back home. 
 
At this point, India should encourage the Ghani administration to open channels with Taliban leaders based in Gulf nations and Iran who want an Afghan-owned peace process. India may find support in these efforts from Gulf countries who are not happy with Pakistan over its refusal to participate in the Yemen conflict. While Gulf monarchies and Iran are on opposite sides in the Yemen conflict, both sides have allowed Taliban factions to operate from their territories. Further, as Iran and Russia are coming closer than ever before, both have interest in checking the growth of Islamist groups in north and west Afghanistan. India should explore all these avenues to the maximum. While the Mansur faction is still the largest, in view of increasing infighting even if a few key leaders can be won over by Kabul that will have a great symbolic effect.
 
So far, Pakistan has failed to deliver peace in Afghanistan. It will not do anything to strengthen the elected Afghan government which is now struggling against the dual threat of Taliban and Islamic State. This legitimizes India increasing its role in Afghanistan -- from being a reconstruction partner to a long-term nodal sustainer of democratic regime as the West cannot perpetuate its military presence for all time to come. In immediate terms, this is further justified by the fact that India has opened composite dialogue with Pakistan despite no progress on terror related issues to help promote larger regional stability.
 
From a bilateral viewpoint, squandering away gains of Ufa is a big price for India. The sustainability and final outcome of the new composite dialogue with Pakistan are as uncertain as those of previous ones. However, if India can capitalize upon opportunities in the larger Af-Pak scenario, it will still be a gainer in the long term.
 

After Paris Attacks: Will Middle East again burn Western hands?

Nov 21, 2015, South Asia Monitor/ Indian Defence Review 

By Divya Kumar Soti
 
As the horrors and plot of 13/11 Paris Attack unfold, its comparison with 26/11 Mumbai carnage becomes unavoidable given the striking similarities in the nature of soft targets chosen by the plotters. But there are stark distinguishing features too. 26/11 Mumbai attacks were basically a Foreign Intelligence Service sponsored act of proxy war against India where terrorists were directed at every step by their Pakistan-based handlers to carry-out prolonged scenes of horror through arson and firing occurring after short intervals. 26/11 was a hit and sit operation, but where terrorists were ultimately neutralized by the Indian Security forces. 13/11 Paris attacks were based on the strategy of quick massacre where terrorists either blew themselves up or absconded. From what we know now, leaving one, most of the attackers blew themselves up as soon as they came into contact with French Security Forces and two of them fled the sight only to be apprehended and killed in a raid a few days after this deadly November night.
 
While 9/11 attacks changed the geopolitics of the world, 26/11 did not. From the western viewpoint, Pakistan continues to be a useful, rather indispensable, rogue state which was to be financed to manage Afghanistan, Jihadism and its nukes were to be saved from any material punishment which may be inflicted by India in retaliation of its war by means of terror. The aftermath of 26/11 in which the West continued to maintain its double-standard on terrorism has some lessons, foremost being that international community’s response to terrorism is guided by hardcore geopolitics and not by the gravity of human tragedy. What takes place matters, but where these tragedies unfold matters more.
 
Terror threat to Europe emanates from the upturning of Middle-Eastern order which the European colonial powers themselves began indulging in after the dissolution of Ottoman Empire at the end of First World War, giving it final shape during the Cold War. This order or system in the Middle East compartmentalized and forced a hand on the forces of Islamist Imperialism which throughout the history have always tried to burst out of this region, and placed dictatorial regimes as air tight lids over these compartments. Another feature of this system was that it was rooted in the imbalance of power between Sunnis and Shias. In that it somehow tried to preserve the historical Sunni hegemony over Middle East. During its tenure, this order ensured stability for the outside world as Islamist threat to Europe and Africa remained distant. 
 
Now, this order stands destroyed due to various geopolitical events: 2003 Iraq invasion, Arab Spring and re-emergence of the Shia Power led by Iran. Islamic State, al-Nusra and lot of other such groups are basically projections of proxy reaction by Sunni monarchies to the rise of Shia Power in Iraq and Syria. While this new “Shia Arc” could have envisaged a new order rooted in the balance of Shia-Sunni Power in the Middle East, it remains unacceptable to Sunni Islamists in Arab world as such a balance never existed since medieval times and does not merit their contemplation. But the rise of Shia Power is a reality now and more likely an irreversible phenomenon.
 
Then there is a Russian twist to the whole saga. In the last few years, Putin’s Russia has made formidable strategic gains in Eurasia and after consolidating itself in Ukraine has emerged as a strong power arbitrator in Syria and Iraq. Seen from NATO’s point of view, after deploying Area-Denial-Weapon-Systems, turning East European skies into a vulnerable space for NATO Aircrafts, Russia has burst out of Eurasian heartland expanding its naval presence the Eastern Mediterranean and now its air power stands deployed in Syria encircling the NATO Missile Defense Batteries deployed in Turkey.
 
Entry of Russia into the Syrian Conflict in support of Shia Assad has created a policy dilemma for US as well as Europe. The approach of US and its European allies had been to declare Assad and Islamic state equally bad while leaving out some other militant groups terming them as moderates. Ironically, some US and European commentators took this narrative to such a high pitch that groups like Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Nusra Front started to look moderate in comparison to IS.
 
Putin figured out this absurdity and took a leap into the Syrian Conflict. Russia’s stance has been to club IS and many other Islamist groups in the elimination category as it plans to sustain the Assad regime. Before 13/11 Paris attacks, traditional specter of Russian strategic expansion loomed large on European capitals and Islamic State suddenly looked like a by-the-way enemy. Recently, the French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian had criticized the Russian intervention in Syria in unequivocal terms saying the Russian intervention was only aimed at saving Assad and is not going after the IS.
 
But now the carnage on Paris streets has pushed the traditional fear of Russian advance to the backburner. President Putin, who had to cut short his visit during the last year’s G-20 summit in Brisbane as he found himself cornered, was setting the narrative on Middle East and Global War on Terror at this year’s G-20 gathering which happened in the immediate aftermath of Paris attacks.
 
While the G-20 meeting progressed, marking a complete policy shift, President Hollande told the French Parliament: “In Syria, we’re looking for the political solution to the problem, which is not Bashar Assad. Our enemy in Syria is ISIL.” Prior to that in Vienna where foreign ministers of 20 stakeholder nations met a day after Paris attacks to discuss Syrian Peace Process, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov sounded assertive about Russia proposed transition plan and classification Syrian Islamist Groups. He said that there is “no justification for us not doing much more to defeat ISIS and al Nusra and the like”. 
 
He was unequivocal in identifying the problem in Syrian conflict which according to him is not about Assad and that ISIS is the enemy, a view which now stands echoed in the new French policy. On the other hand, Secretary Kerry sounded ambiguous and confused on the classification of the groups fighting in Syria and their motivations: “It can’t end as long as Bashar Assad is there. That’s the perception of the people waging the War.”
 
Whatever may be the outcome of this proposed transition process, Shia power in both Iraq and Syria stands rescued from succumbing to the all round onslaught which means that Sunni monarchies will continue to finance jihadist groups in these countries and that terrorism may continue to spill out of this region particularly to Europe, North and West Africa.
 
While all this happens, the debate in US continues to be focused on stopping Russia. The US wants to go back into its classic isolationist mode but circumstances do not permit it this comfort. Steering through this confusion, it hopes to direct the events in Middle East through calculative use of air power and financing the proxies. Further, Washington is reeling under pressure from the Sunni Arab Allies like Saudi Arabia as well as Israel on the other hand to check Iran. As G-20 leaders in Turkey brainstormed over stabilizing the Middle East, the US cleared the sale of more than $1 billion worth of smart air ammunition to Saudis which they will probably use against Houthi Shias in Yemen.
 
In such circumstances, where the distinction between ‘good and bad terrorists’ may no longer catch the global interest, the classification of ‘useful’ terrorists vis-à-vis those that are not so useful will continue to be employed on the Syrian battlefront.