Thursday, November 28, 2013

Intelligence Bureau: Informal but not Unconstitutional


Recent Gauhati HC decision on constitutional validity of CBI has sparked off a similar debate about India’s premier intelligence agency, Intelligence Bureau (IB) which, according to a RTI reply by Home Ministry, was created through consent given by Secretary of State for India.

However, the nature of IB’s functions makes it a case in complete contrast to that of CBI. CBI exercises various police powers like arrest and prosecution, which essentially involve deprivation of “personal liberty” of the accused. Under Article 21 of the Constitution, any such denial of personal liberty requires support of “formal” executive or legislative action.

IB, in contrast, does not exercise any of the police powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Neither does it arrest nor does it prosecute anybody. It is just an information gathering mechanism of the government. This also makes IB different from intelligence-cum-investigation agencies like FBI which apart from gathering intelligence perform police functions of arrest and prosecution.

Some of IB’s functions like electronic espionage which may involve invasion of constitutional guarantee of “personal liberty” as enshrined in Article 21 are performed under formal laws like Telegraph Act which provide for “due procedure” as well as oversight of “competent authority” like Home Secretary, thus satisfying the requirement of constitutional jurisprudence as evolved by Supreme Court through a series of decisions.

The mention of Central Bureau of Intelligence in Schedule VII of the Constitution is an enabling provision investing the Parliament with legislative competence to enact laws for the re-creation or regulation of such an agency. A perusal of Entries in Schedule VII with its controlling provisions contained in Articles 245 and 246 makes it pertinently clear that Parliament “may” legislate on these subjects but it is nowhere mandatory for it to do so. It may make a choice of not interfering in administrative arrangements which were already in place at the commencement of the Constitution.

Article 375 which is a special provision in this regard further reaffirms this position by laying down that “all officers judicial, executive and ministerial shall continue to exercise their respective functions, subject to the provisions of this constitution.” So, IB as an administrative mechanism of information gathering continues to be valid on constitutional standards despite its informal creation. 

Tuesday, November 12, 2013

A Twist in the Middle-East Tale


By talking over phone President Obama and Iran’s newly elected President Rouhani may have started to spell the new equations which have the potential of simplifying the extremely complicated geo-politics of middle-east. This historic rapprochement between West and the Iran will have long-term soothing effect on highly volatile situation in post-Arab spring era.

An acrimonious relationship with Iran makes US devote much of its energy in Middle-East to futile activities which do not help any of its long-term strategic goals nor do in any way contribute to global security scenario. George Bush’s inclusion of Iran to “axis of evil” phraseology only complicated and delayed US war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and thereafter Iraq in 2003, a hemmed Iran naturally found itself vulnerable. Washington’s hostile attitude further worsened the situation and allowed radicals in Iran to rise to power.

Iran had a stake in toppling of Taliban regime in Afghanistan which was extremely hostile to Iranian interests. When Taliban came to power in Kabul in 1996, it made all attempts to curtail Iranian influence in Afghanistan. Large scale selective killings of Shias were organized by the Taliban government. Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif was attacked and ten Iranian diplomats were killed. Iran had to amass 300,000 troops on its border with Afghanistan threatening to punish the Taliban regime.

However, Bush’s axis of evil rhetoric forced Iran to covertly help the Taliban after post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan by US so as to keep US military engaged and stretched. Similar things also transpired in Iraq. Saddam Hussein was Iran’s sworn enemy but after fall of Saddam regime Iran had to initially work at cross-purposes to US to keep US forces at bay. Things stabilized in Iraq only after Washington realized that a head on approach against Iranian clients will not be helpful. Ultimately Iranian covert co-operation in quelling the violence allowed US to withdraw its troops from Iraq.

Withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan which is scheduled next year will bring back things to per-9/11 era. There will be no substantial US military presence either in Iraq or Afghanistan. On the other hand, Iran will be faced with a resurgent Al- Qaeda on its west in Iraq which aims to push that nation into civil war and a hostile Taliban which will try to destabilize Afghanistan staking claims to power in Kabul to its East. All this has serious implications for Iranian interests in the region.

A glimpse of approaching turbulence is already visible. Pakistan’s tribal areas witnessed some of the most ghastly attacks mounted on Shias ever. At the same time, a terrorist group named Jundullah founded by Abdul Malik Rigi, who was a former Taliban commander and operates from Pakistani territory sprung into action after many years and killed sixteen Iranian border guards. In Iraq, Al-Qaeda’s activities are recording an exponential increase.

After UN sponsored chemical weapons deal with Assad regime, Iranian and US priorities are changing fast bringing them into cohesion. Going forward Washington will be increasingly focused on checking resurgence of Al-Qaeda and allied groups in the Islamic world. Similarly, these groups are emerging as greater threats to Iranian interests in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan than the West.

Sunday, October 27, 2013

Patna Blasts: Result of failure to capitalise on Yasin Bhatkal's arrest

Investigations have uncovered Indian Mujahideen's hand behind Patna Serial Blasts. Bihar Police was successful in nabbing one planter Imtiaz. His interrogation revealed a larger IM module functioning in Bihar, Jharkhand and Eastern U.P. under Tahseen aleas Monu. Thaseen is considered right hand of IM's arrested operations's chief Yasin Bhatkal.

While following up on information revealed by Yasin Bhatkal, security agencies took action in South India and raided some IM safe houses, action against Darbhanga module was missing. Bihar Police never tried to interrogate Yasin Bhatkal who when he was arrested by security agencies was carrying out recruitment in Bihar.

It is now very clear that Bihar Police took no action on leads emerging from interrogation of Yasin Bhatkal. Bihar Police had also rubbished the theory that IM was behind Bodh Gaya blasts. However, Patna serial blasts closely follow the pattern of Bodh Gaya Blasts as like in latter numerous low intensity IEDs were detonated at Gandhi Maidan at quick succession.

Evidently, IM's Darbhanga Module continued its activities unabated even after Yasin Bhatkal's arrest. Investigation in Patna Serial is revealing names of newer recruits and IM's network in Jharkhand and East U.P.

Even on security side Bihar Police put up a very bad show. Bomb Disposal Squads worked in Safari Suits handling the IEDs bare handed without any gadgets. One bomb went off while cops tried to diffuse it. Unable to diffuse the rest, Police exploded them by putting them on fire.

Planters were able to lace a bomb just 80 feet from dais which means all security rings made by Bihar Police were breached. Police has not been able to fully sanitize the Gandhi Maidan even after 24 hours. 

Saturday, October 12, 2013

How Infiltrators managed to retreat from Shala Bhata

In an interview with Hindustan Times, GOC XV Corps has admitted that his boys have neither recovered a single dead body nor any equipment belonging to infiltrators from inside the cordon area in Shala Bhata village in Keran Sector.

Though it was very clear since Oct 2 when for the first time Indian Army broke this news to the nation, that Pakistani Border Action Team (BAT) was trying to break the Indian cordon to rescue the infiltrators trapped inside the cordon. I have dealt with this new tactic in detail in one of my previous posts.

But what constitutes a big surprise is the fact that Pak BAT seems to have been fully successful in its attempt to effectively engage and pierce the Indian cordon. This could not have been possible without a large scale rescue effort by Pakistanis supported by heavy ammunition support, exceeding the ceasefire norms thrust upon the Indian Army.

If one is to go by statements of GOC XV Corps it becomes clear that Pak BAT was repeatedly trying to "round up" the outer flanks of the cordon. This is a classic medieval technique having a guerilla element with Central Asian origins which has turned the tide of numerous battles fought over last ten centuries in Indian sub-continent.  The peripheries of cordon touching the LoC made it further vulnerable.

But the key question relates not to the ability of Indian Army to deal with such situations but with political will. Our army is fully capable to deal with such tactics. But that requires aggressive tactical manoeuvring backed with clear political directions. The way Shala Bhata infiltration was kept pressed under the carpet for nine days to allow PM Manmohan Singh to meet Nawaz Sharif says everything. Another notable point is that any strong reaction from political leadership in India over Shala Bhata incident has been missing.

The peace at any cost policy will put Indian Army at a serious disadvantage in this cruel quest for domination along LoC. This will naturally have consequences for security environment in J&K as well as in larger strategic context as Pak Army is likely to progressively heat-up the LoC in run up to US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in order to redeploy its strategic assets returning fro Afghanistan.


Wednesday, October 9, 2013

Security Lessons from Westgate Attack


As gory details of massacre at Nairobi’s Westgate Mall conducted by Somalia’s Jehadist group Al-Shabab become clearer, vulnerability of neighborhood shopping centers to such carnage is more apparent than ever before.

Terrorist attack at Nairobi’s Westgate Mall repeats some lessons which 26/11 Mumbai attacks taught us for the first time but which are still to be fully assimilated by our security establishment.

We may sharpen the preventive capabilities of our intelligence agencies to best possible limits but still terrorists will be having one in a hundred chance. Even target hardening has its limitations in view of crystallizing patterns of trans-national urban terrorism. After Parliament attack in 2001, most of the terrorist attacks in Indian hinterland came against “soft targets”. In this vast nation it is impossible to guard each and every public place.

Most of the major shopping centers today have a security drill designed to stop plantation of explosives. Private security agencies guarding these establishments as well as local policemen are ill-trained and ill-equipped to deal with highly-trained gunmen attacks like those we witnessed on 26/11 and just a few days back in Nairobi.

In event of such attacks effectively engaging the gunmen within first hour of attack is essential to minimize the loss of life and property. This role essentially falls upon local Police force which is obviously the first one to reach the spot. Special counter-terrorism battalions like National Security Guards (NSG) come into the picture at a later stage.

Afghan cities like Kabul face many attacks like 26/11 and Westgate attack every year. But Afghan security forces have been successful in minimizing the civilian casualties in such attacks due to their ability to efficaciously engage the attackers at the outset of attack which leaves them with little time to cause civilian deaths and hostage taking.

State Police forces in India need to rise up to the challenges urban terrorism is posing. A compact Quick Reaction Team (QRT), well-trained and well-equipped to deal with such attacks should be deployed at every major urban centre so that attackers may be engaged and cornered quickly. In absence of such provisioning we remain vulnerable to a Westgate Mall type of carnage.

What transpired in cyber-space during Westgate mall seize also leaves us with clues to social media management in times of crisis like these and how alert netizens can play a very important role. As Al-Shabab started to live tweet the details of horrible selective massacre its operatives were conducting at Westgate Mall, alert Kenyan twitter users started reporting this to twitter administration which blocked Al-Shabab every time it came up with a new account. Four accounts of Al-Shabab were blocked during first 24 hours of the attack and two more were blocked in following days.

Wednesday, October 2, 2013

Assessment of Situation in Shala Bhata

India tried a tiny talk with Nawaz Sharif and is now faced with a tiny Kargil. From what we know now that is how we can define the situation in Shala Bhata in Keran. Indian troops are locked in a close fight with Pak special troopers from its notorious Border Action Team for the ninth day.

Though Infiltrators in Shala Bhata do not enjoy effective control but area is still far from being "secured" by the Indian Army.Most alarming thing coming out of the Press Conference of GoC XV Corps is that Pak BATs are constantly trying to break the Indian Army's cordon from Pakistani side which means a complicated situation.

This also explains in part as to how all this may have happened. The first batch of infiltrators crossing on 23rd September were effectively intercepted by the Indian army. It is very clear that more compact batches were pushed later and Indian cordon was engaged by Pak BAT. This is in contrast with previous experiences when infiltrators once pushed inside Indian territory used to be "abandoned".

However, this time Pak BATs are trying to attack and break through the Indian cordon on Indian side of LoC even on the ninth day. This indicates two things- first, infiltrators trapped inside Indian cordon are no ordinary infiltrators; second, Pakistani side has something more than a mere big infiltration attempt on their minds. This is not just another area domination attempt with tactical overtones but confrontational attitude with political undercurrents. To deal with such a situation some aggressive tactical manoeuvring by the Indian troops will be required. A clear political message is pre-requisite for that.

Saturday, August 24, 2013

Avoid Peace Trap set by Pakistan


Hindustan Times, 22 Aug 2013

In India, the debate over our Pakistan Policy swings between two extremes of jingoism and over-enthusiasm affording us little opportunity to examine on merits the peace proposals which are conceptualized through track two diplomatic channels.

While during track two dialogue Indian side has repeatedly rejected Pakistan’s proposals of “redrawing of borders” and “joint administration of Kashmir valley”, the idea of making the LoC “irrelevant” has fascinated many in India.

It has often been argued that India-Pak peace process shall be de-linked from terrorism as various terrorist groups operating from Pak soil have vested interests in sabotaging it. Though there may be some truth in this but without going into debate surrounding this argument we shall take it up on practical terms. Making borders irrelevant for achieving peace in Kashmir involves withdrawal of both the armies from LoC and relaxation of restrictions on free movement of people across the LoC. Such a scenario will be disadvantageous to India as long as terrorist infrastructure remains intact on Pakistan’s side of LoC. Pakistan will be able to pursue its strategic aims in Kashmir valley by unleashing the jehadi machine it controls as well as by stoking trouble through separatists in Kashmir valley who are increasingly working in synchronization with ISI’s policies and openly sharing stage with jehadists like Hafiz Saeed.

Out of the four wars Pakistan fought with India, three broke out due to Pakistan’s attempts to militarily redraw its borders with India, either directly or through its proxies. While in 1947 Pakistan pushed tribals into Kashmir valley, in 1965 Pak Army itself came dressed as ‘Rajakars’. Kargil war also was a Pak Army- Mujahideen joint operation to shift the LoC. Even in Siachen we had a close shave in 1984 when an intelligence tip-off alerted us just in time about Pakistani plans to occupy the glacier in a Kargil kind of perfidy.

As all these attempts failed badly, Gen Musharraf started to lure India into this “irrelevant border” trap. Indian leadership encouraged by deescalating militancy in Kashmir and fall in cross-border infiltration attempts after 2003 ceasefire has been responsive to this proposal.




Pakistan
has always tried to break free of Shimla Agreement which Zulfikar Bhutto had described to be as humiliating to Pakistan as Treaty of Versailles was for Germany. After Kargil debacle and in post 9/11 conditions Pakistan’s Kashmir policy rests on stoking internal unrest in Kashmir and somehow securing some concessions from India on diplomatic table which in effect neutralizes the Shimla Agreement and allow it to create a 1948 kind of situation. Therefore while Pak leadership makes all the right noises on Indo-Pak talks, it continues to maintain the terrorist infrastructure aimed against India on its soil.

The reliability of diplomatic accords which we sign with Pakistan has always been poor. Pakistan has always flouted Shimla agreement, buried the Lahore Joint Statement in Kargil and continues to flout Jan 2004 joint statement. Pakistan will miss no opportunity to exploit an irrelevant LoC by pushing in jehadis, stoking secessionism and again calling for international intervention.

Dismantling of terrorist infrastructure on Pak soil must remain necessary pre-condition of any meaningful and sustainable dialogue. Lasting peace like an embryo must pass through sequential stages. Any attempt to change the sequence is sure to result in disaster.

(The writer is a national security analyst.)