Patna Blasts: Result of failure to capitalise on Yasin Bhatkal's arrest

Investigations have uncovered Indian Mujahideen's hand behind Patna Serial Blasts. Bihar Police was successful in nabbing one planter Imtiaz. His interrogation revealed a larger IM module functioning in Bihar, Jharkhand and Eastern U.P. under Tahseen aleas Monu. Thaseen is considered right hand of IM's arrested operations's chief Yasin Bhatkal.

While following up on information revealed by Yasin Bhatkal, security agencies took action in South India and raided some IM safe houses, action against Darbhanga module was missing. Bihar Police never tried to interrogate Yasin Bhatkal who when he was arrested by security agencies was carrying out recruitment in Bihar.

It is now very clear that Bihar Police took no action on leads emerging from interrogation of Yasin Bhatkal. Bihar Police had also rubbished the theory that IM was behind Bodh Gaya blasts. However, Patna serial blasts closely follow the pattern of Bodh Gaya Blasts as like in latter numerous low intensity IEDs were detonated at Gandhi Maidan at quick succession.

Evidently, IM's Darbhanga Module continued its activities unabated even after Yasin Bhatkal's arrest. Investigation in Patna Serial is revealing names of newer recruits and IM's network in Jharkhand and East U.P.

Even on security side Bihar Police put up a very bad show. Bomb Disposal Squads worked in Safari Suits handling the IEDs bare handed without any gadgets. One bomb went off while cops tried to diffuse it. Unable to diffuse the rest, Police exploded them by putting them on fire.

Planters were able to lace a bomb just 80 feet from dais which means all security rings made by Bihar Police were breached. Police has not been able to fully sanitize the Gandhi Maidan even after 24 hours. 

How Infiltrators managed to retreat from Shala Bhata

In an interview with Hindustan Times, GOC XV Corps has admitted that his boys have neither recovered a single dead body nor any equipment belonging to infiltrators from inside the cordon area in Shala Bhata village in Keran Sector.

Though it was very clear since Oct 2 when for the first time Indian Army broke this news to the nation, that Pakistani Border Action Team (BAT) was trying to break the Indian cordon to rescue the infiltrators trapped inside the cordon. I have dealt with this new tactic in detail in one of my previous posts.

But what constitutes a big surprise is the fact that Pak BAT seems to have been fully successful in its attempt to effectively engage and pierce the Indian cordon. This could not have been possible without a large scale rescue effort by Pakistanis supported by heavy ammunition support, exceeding the ceasefire norms thrust upon the Indian Army.

If one is to go by statements of GOC XV Corps it becomes clear that Pak BAT was repeatedly trying to "round up" the outer flanks of the cordon. This is a classic medieval technique having a guerilla element with Central Asian origins which has turned the tide of numerous battles fought over last ten centuries in Indian sub-continent.  The peripheries of cordon touching the LoC made it further vulnerable.

But the key question relates not to the ability of Indian Army to deal with such situations but with political will. Our army is fully capable to deal with such tactics. But that requires aggressive tactical manoeuvring backed with clear political directions. The way Shala Bhata infiltration was kept pressed under the carpet for nine days to allow PM Manmohan Singh to meet Nawaz Sharif says everything. Another notable point is that any strong reaction from political leadership in India over Shala Bhata incident has been missing.

The peace at any cost policy will put Indian Army at a serious disadvantage in this cruel quest for domination along LoC. This will naturally have consequences for security environment in J&K as well as in larger strategic context as Pak Army is likely to progressively heat-up the LoC in run up to US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in order to redeploy its strategic assets returning fro Afghanistan.

Security Lessons from Westgate Attack

As gory details of massacre at Nairobi’s Westgate Mall conducted by Somalia’s Jehadist group Al-Shabab become clearer, vulnerability of neighborhood shopping centers to such carnage is more apparent than ever before.

Terrorist attack at Nairobi’s Westgate Mall repeats some lessons which 26/11 Mumbai attacks taught us for the first time but which are still to be fully assimilated by our security establishment.

We may sharpen the preventive capabilities of our intelligence agencies to best possible limits but still terrorists will be having one in a hundred chance. Even target hardening has its limitations in view of crystallizing patterns of trans-national urban terrorism. After Parliament attack in 2001, most of the terrorist attacks in Indian hinterland came against “soft targets”. In this vast nation it is impossible to guard each and every public place.

Most of the major shopping centers today have a security drill designed to stop plantation of explosives. Private security agencies guarding these establishments as well as local policemen are ill-trained and ill-equipped to deal with highly-trained gunmen attacks like those we witnessed on 26/11 and just a few days back in Nairobi.

In event of such attacks effectively engaging the gunmen within first hour of attack is essential to minimize the loss of life and property. This role essentially falls upon local Police force which is obviously the first one to reach the spot. Special counter-terrorism battalions like National Security Guards (NSG) come into the picture at a later stage.

Afghan cities like Kabul face many attacks like 26/11 and Westgate attack every year. But Afghan security forces have been successful in minimizing the civilian casualties in such attacks due to their ability to efficaciously engage the attackers at the outset of attack which leaves them with little time to cause civilian deaths and hostage taking.

State Police forces in India need to rise up to the challenges urban terrorism is posing. A compact Quick Reaction Team (QRT), well-trained and well-equipped to deal with such attacks should be deployed at every major urban centre so that attackers may be engaged and cornered quickly. In absence of such provisioning we remain vulnerable to a Westgate Mall type of carnage.

What transpired in cyber-space during Westgate mall seize also leaves us with clues to social media management in times of crisis like these and how alert netizens can play a very important role. As Al-Shabab started to live tweet the details of horrible selective massacre its operatives were conducting at Westgate Mall, alert Kenyan twitter users started reporting this to twitter administration which blocked Al-Shabab every time it came up with a new account. Four accounts of Al-Shabab were blocked during first 24 hours of the attack and two more were blocked in following days.

Assessment of Situation in Shala Bhata

India tried a tiny talk with Nawaz Sharif and is now faced with a tiny Kargil. From what we know now that is how we can define the situation in Shala Bhata in Keran. Indian troops are locked in a close fight with Pak special troopers from its notorious Border Action Team for the ninth day.

Though Infiltrators in Shala Bhata do not enjoy effective control but area is still far from being "secured" by the Indian Army.Most alarming thing coming out of the Press Conference of GoC XV Corps is that Pak BATs are constantly trying to break the Indian Army's cordon from Pakistani side which means a complicated situation.

This also explains in part as to how all this may have happened. The first batch of infiltrators crossing on 23rd September were effectively intercepted by the Indian army. It is very clear that more compact batches were pushed later and Indian cordon was engaged by Pak BAT. This is in contrast with previous experiences when infiltrators once pushed inside Indian territory used to be "abandoned".

However, this time Pak BATs are trying to attack and break through the Indian cordon on Indian side of LoC even on the ninth day. This indicates two things- first, infiltrators trapped inside Indian cordon are no ordinary infiltrators; second, Pakistani side has something more than a mere big infiltration attempt on their minds. This is not just another area domination attempt with tactical overtones but confrontational attitude with political undercurrents. To deal with such a situation some aggressive tactical manoeuvring by the Indian troops will be required. A clear political message is pre-requisite for that.

Avoid Peace Trap set by Pakistan

Hindustan Times, 22 Aug 2013

In India, the debate over our Pakistan Policy swings between two extremes of jingoism and over-enthusiasm affording us little opportunity to examine on merits the peace proposals which are conceptualized through track two diplomatic channels.

While during track two dialogue Indian side has repeatedly rejected Pakistan’s proposals of “redrawing of borders” and “joint administration of Kashmir valley”, the idea of making the LoC “irrelevant” has fascinated many in India.

It has often been argued that India-Pak peace process shall be de-linked from terrorism as various terrorist groups operating from Pak soil have vested interests in sabotaging it. Though there may be some truth in this but without going into debate surrounding this argument we shall take it up on practical terms. Making borders irrelevant for achieving peace in Kashmir involves withdrawal of both the armies from LoC and relaxation of restrictions on free movement of people across the LoC. Such a scenario will be disadvantageous to India as long as terrorist infrastructure remains intact on Pakistan’s side of LoC. Pakistan will be able to pursue its strategic aims in Kashmir valley by unleashing the jehadi machine it controls as well as by stoking trouble through separatists in Kashmir valley who are increasingly working in synchronization with ISI’s policies and openly sharing stage with jehadists like Hafiz Saeed.

Out of the four wars Pakistan fought with India, three broke out due to Pakistan’s attempts to militarily redraw its borders with India, either directly or through its proxies. While in 1947 Pakistan pushed tribals into Kashmir valley, in 1965 Pak Army itself came dressed as ‘Rajakars’. Kargil war also was a Pak Army- Mujahideen joint operation to shift the LoC. Even in Siachen we had a close shave in 1984 when an intelligence tip-off alerted us just in time about Pakistani plans to occupy the glacier in a Kargil kind of perfidy.

As all these attempts failed badly, Gen Musharraf started to lure India into this “irrelevant border” trap. Indian leadership encouraged by deescalating militancy in Kashmir and fall in cross-border infiltration attempts after 2003 ceasefire has been responsive to this proposal.

Pakistan has always tried to break free of Shimla Agreement which Zulfikar Bhutto had described to be as humiliating to Pakistan as Treaty of Versailles was for Germany. After Kargil debacle and in post 9/11 conditions Pakistan’s Kashmir policy rests on stoking internal unrest in Kashmir and somehow securing some concessions from India on diplomatic table which in effect neutralizes the Shimla Agreement and allow it to create a 1948 kind of situation. Therefore while Pak leadership makes all the right noises on Indo-Pak talks, it continues to maintain the terrorist infrastructure aimed against India on its soil.

The reliability of diplomatic accords which we sign with Pakistan has always been poor. Pakistan has always flouted Shimla agreement, buried the Lahore Joint Statement in Kargil and continues to flout Jan 2004 joint statement. Pakistan will miss no opportunity to exploit an irrelevant LoC by pushing in jehadis, stoking secessionism and again calling for international intervention.

Dismantling of terrorist infrastructure on Pak soil must remain necessary pre-condition of any meaningful and sustainable dialogue. Lasting peace like an embryo must pass through sequential stages. Any attempt to change the sequence is sure to result in disaster.

(The writer is a national security analyst.)

Emergence of Qatar as Track Two Player and India's Afghanistan Policy

From hosting Doha talks between US and Taliban to covertly supporting rebels in Libya and Syria, Qatar has been trying to increase its clout in Islamic world by leveraging its strategic importance in Middle-East. Qatar houses US CENCOM and has world's third largest natural gas reserves. Though Washington has often came to war of words with Doha on Al-Zazeera, Qatar continues to be a country of increasing importance in its Middle-East policy.

Due to the efforts of Qatar's erstwhile emir ,who was described by a recent BBC report as "Middle-East's Kissinger", Doha has become a hub of track two diplomacy in Middle-East. Even in military terms, Qatar's importance has been increasing ever since Bush administration decided to vacate Saudi bases.

Ironically, Qatar gains wherever Saudis loose. Saudi relations with Taliban have been progressively deteriorating since 1998, when Mullah Omar went back on his promises of handing over Bin Laden to Saudis. Saudi attempts to broker peace in Afghanistan failed badly in 2008-09 because many Northern Alliance leaders as well as Taliban factions were not ready to accept Saudi mediation. All this helped Qatar to become Taliban's diplomatic patron and many Taliban representatives are now permanently stationed in Doha.

Qatar also backed Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt which has a history of bad relations with Riyadh. Saudi Royals have always seen Brotherhood as a potent political threat to their regime. Though with the toppling of Morsi government by Egyptian Army, Saudis are back in game, nevertheless, Qatar remains a key player in Egypt as at some point political rapprochement with Muslim Brotherhood is unavoidable for the new Egyptian regime and there are already voices from inside the new government criticising the Egyptian Army's high handedness in dealing with Brotherhood protests.  Furthermore, there are fears of Salafists and Al-Qaeda taking advantage of current situation in Egypt and echos are starting to come out of Washington with Senator McCain describing the toppling of Morsi regime as a "coup".

Though many analysts saw happenings in Egypt as an endgame for tiny Qatar's participation in heavyweight diplomacy, the above noted developments suggest otherwise. It is true that overthrowing of Morsi government by Egyptian Army was bit of a setback for Qatar which was in power transition mode, but Qatar's new Emir is smartly trying to salvage the situation by trying rapprochement with Riyadh.

After backing rebels in Libya, Qatar has also emerged as a key player in Syrian conflict and have been shrugging off US and Saudi concerns about shipping shoulder fired heat seeking missiles to Syrian rebels.

Qatar continues to have close contacts with other side of Islamic world and with its strategic location and petrodollars, it is likely to remain a track two hub in foreseeable future.

India has a strategic partnership with Qatar. Two countries had signed Defence Co-operation Agreement in 2008 which provides for close military co-operation and joint defence production. This partnership is important for Qatar as it seeks to diversify its dependence on US in military terms. New Delhi should try to revitalize its relations with Doha. India needs to come to terms with the prospective ground situation in Afghanistan after US troop withdrawal in 2014 and thus, shall keep open some sort of back channel with Taliban. What makes this track two channel even more necessary is the perception that India may have to face typical security situations in Afghanistan. The new Nawaz Sharif Government has close relations with Saudis and Saudis are also likely to play on Pakistani line as due to their unacceptability in Afghanistan they are left with little room for having independent choices. This situation may be utilized by India for its advantage in Afghanistan.

William Dalrymple’s Wrong Conclusions about Evolution of Pak Army’s Doctrine of “Strategic Depth”

Threats which Afghanistan and India have been facing over the last two decades emanate from Pakistan Army’s much debated and discussed Doctrine of "Strategic Depth". This strategic depth theory was conceptualized after Pakistan’s defeat in 14-days war with India in 1971 which resulted in East Pakistan becoming an independent nation as Bangladesh. At that time paranoia had engulfed Pakistan and it was feared that conventionally superior Indian Military could easily annihilate Pak Army and Air force and Indian Navy can easily blockade the Karachi port and choke or occupy Pakistan within few days. So, it was considered necessary to have a friendly government in Kabul which should be averse to any Indian influence and provide refuge to retreating Pak Army in event of an all out Indian Military onslaught so as to save it from annihilation and allow it to wage guerilla warfare against  Indian forces from mountainous regions of Afghanistan. This is the most widely marketed and accepted version of Strategic depth theory in West which made William Dalrymple in his recently published Brookings essay "A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India" argue that the roots of all instability in Af-Pak region lie in so called India-Pak proxy war which is supposedly underway in Afghanistan. However, as we shall see, this black and white analysis misses at least two third of the real story of birth and evolution of the concept of Strategic depth, both in theory as well as in practice. Let us examine those left out causes, namely, the Iran-Saudi Arabia Cold War and Pakistan’s own geopolitical ambitions which have the potential to sustain the instability in Af-Pak as well as the global terrorism even if India goes out of picture from Afghanistan.

Iran-Saudi Arabia Cold War in Af-Pak

The Iranian Shiite revolution of 1979 was seen as a threat by Saudi royal family which rules over regions with Shia majority. From 1980 onwards the apprehensions of Saudi Royals began to materialize when Iranian pilgrims started political activities during the Hajj ceremony. Saudis saw it as an attempt by Khomeini to replicate a larger Shia uprising in the Middle East. From 1981 onwards regular clashes between Saudi pilgrims and Saudi Police and escalation of sectarian tensions were witnessed during the Hajj ceremony. All this ultimately culminated in violent clashes between Saudi Police and Iranian pilgrims during Hajj ceremony on 31 July, 1987, which according to Iranian allegations left 400 Iranian pilgrims dead. After this event, Iranian spiritual leaders openly attacked the legitimacy of Saudi royal family’s rule. Khomeini publicly declared, “These vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back,” and announced that Mecca was in the hands of “a band of heretics.” Saudi royal family was described by his deputy Montezri as “a bunch of English agents from Najd who have no respect either for the House of God or for the pilgrims who are the guests of God.” Just as Jerusalem would be liberated from the “claws of usurping Israel,” Mecca and Medina would be liberated from the “claws of Al Sa‘ud.” All this intensified the already underway Saudi-Iranian cold war which soon spread to Afghanistan. After 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both Iran and Pakistan supported the anti-soviet insurgency but their support was divided on ethnic and sectarian lines. While Pakistan colluded with Saudi Arabia to create Pashtun Mujahideen who were indoctrinated through Wahabi Madarsas being run in Pakistan financed by Saudi Charities and thus obviously inimical to Shia Iran; Iran supported Tajiks and Hazaras. This divide survived even after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and after Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supported Taliban taking over Kabul in 1996 all attempts were made to minimize Iran’s sphere of influence. Selective killings of Shias were organized by the new Taliban government. In Bamiyan province alone around 5000 Shias were killed by Taliban. Iranian Consulate in Mazar-e-sharif was attacked and ten Iranian diplomats were killed. Iran responded by amassing 300,000 troops on its borders with Afghanistan and threatened to punish the Taliban regime.

The Saudi apprehensions about rise of Iran were shared by Sunni radicals in Pakistan who smelled the presence of a fifth column everywhere after 1971. Thus after 1979, the Shias were begun to be seen with suspicion in Pakistan. The Wahhabi radical version of Islam which was being propagated with Pakistani State patronage to indoctrinate the foot soldiers of “strategic depth” further fuelled anti-Shia sentiments in Pakistani society. Money flowing through Saudi Charities was used in raising anti-shia terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Saheba, to minimize Iran’s influence in Pak by organizing regular attacks on Shia community. The after math continues to play out in Afghanistan and Pakistan till today with suicide bombings of Shia processions and regular massacres in Shia localities.

Initial Practice of “Strategic Depth”

When Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan readily offered its services to CIA and Saudis. However, ISI’s aim was not just to throw out the Soviet Union from Afghanistan or counter Indian influence over Kabul. But at that time Pakistan lacked the capability of realizing the dreams of becoming a regional master. Pak was trying to recover from the shock of 1971 and General Zia was propagating radical Sunni Islam which was seen as the only binding force which would hold Pakistan together amid its growing contradictions. Those who could not be accommodated within this new theological model, namely Shias, Ahmadis and Balochs are to be contained through the strategic assets which this model produced. At that time, CIA would not allow opening of an India front as it will involve shifting of resources from Afghanistan towards India and thus affect the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan. So, ISI had to remain content with arming Sikh terrorist groups in Indian Punjab. Throughout the 80’s Pak Army kept its strategic aims subservient to those of US and Saudi Arabia and used the opportunity to acquire and develop credible nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis India.

Pakistan’s Geopolitical Ambitions: From Strategic Depth to Strategic Breadth

By the time Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, initial thesis of Strategic Depth theory was totally outdated. By 1986-87 Pakistan had successfully developed a nuclear weapon and had acquired credible delivery platforms. The fear of an all-out Indian invasion was fast vanishing from power corridors of Islamabad and Rawalpindi and was being replaced by a new confidence which emanated from the “victory” over a “super-power like Soviet Union.” However, Pakistani leaders and Generals continued to legitimize their policy of using terror organizations as an instrument of State policy internally as well as externally by referring to “Indian threat.” The Pak Army’s “strategic assets” being extremely zealous forces could not have been kept idle otherwise like lamp’s Jinni they could have very well end up consuming their own masters. So Pak Army which was by that time well settled in the nuclear saddle decided to divert freed up resources from Afghanistan towards India. The policy of Strategic depth was transformed to that of Strategic Breadth and object was to make Indian State succumb to bleeding through “thousand cuts.” The very fact that Pakistan decided to launch a militant onslaught towards India and did not changed this policy even when these terrorist depredations on Indian territory repeatedly bring two nations on brink of nuclear war is in itself enough an evidence that there was no fear of an Indian onslaught left and thus initial premises requiring the seeking of Strategic depth in Afghanistan had vanished. Pakistan was very well conscious of its newly acquired nuclear deterrence as well as the new international order. From 1990 onwards Strategic Depth Doctrine witnessed a complete transformation, its new objectives being- First, to keep Afghanistan under Pakistan’s sphere of influence and slowly transform it to status of a satellite state of Pakistan. This along with Pakistan’s nuclear capability put Pakistan on some sort of a geo-political throne. It was also helpful in managing the Pashtun nationalism which could have threatened Pakistan’s integrity. Pak Army through its proxies was able to realize effective control over Pashtun areas despite maintaining physical absence from these areas. Second, to serve Saudi interests in Afghanistan by containing Iranian influence through its proxies. This is well evidenced in Taliban’s actions against Iranian interests and Shias after it occupied Kabul. This policy was aimed to keep up the flow of Saudi money to Pak Army’s “strategic assets” which was particularly necessary in wake of ISI’s expanding adventures from Afghanistan to India and money flow from Washington drying up after Soviet withdrawal. Third, to usurp the whole of Kashmir by fuelling secessionism and cross-border terrorism. Fourth, to avenge the 1971 defeat by supporting terrorist attacks throughout India and thereby impair India’s economy and communal harmony.

  

Pakistan’s Policy post-9/11: Interim Adjustments

In post-9/11 scenario, Pakistan had to amend its Afghanistan policy in wake of American threats of being “bombed back to stone age” and “with us or against us” demarcation. However, this change in policy was full of inertia and was reluctantly affected under extremely onerous circumstances. As Gen Musharraf recalled in his autobiography that he conducted theoretical ‘war games’ and found that Pak Army had no chance if it continued to support Taliban and Al-Qaeda. So, the Afghanistan policy adopted by Pak Army after Soviet withdrawal was so dear to Pak Army that it contemplated confrontational scenarios with US before reluctantly giving up its support for Al-Qaeda and Taliban. However, not all Generals were on the same page as far as this policy shift was concerned. The delegation headed by then ISI chief Lt Gen Mahmood Ahmad which was sent to Afghanistan by Gen Musharraf on 16 Sep, 2001 to pressurize Mullah Omar to agree to hand over Osama Bin Laden to Americans reportedly advised Mullah Omar not to hand over Osama Bin Laden at all. Ten years later, Osama Bin Laden would be found by CIA in a Pak Army cantonment area in Abbottabad.

To minimize the damage ISI classified these organizations into three categories- First category consisted of the obedient assets which were ready to act in Afghanistan in accordance with Army’s new policy and did not seek to destabilize Pakistan, namely, Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network. Second category consisted of those who saw the new policy as a sell out to US and were not ready to fall in line and seek to convert Pakistan into a true Islamic state and started to carry out terror attacks inside Pakistan to achieve that end. Most pertinent illustration is that of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Operations were launched against these groups by Pak army. Third category consisted of groups which were to be employed against India, Iran and for domestic purposes, namely, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hijb-ul-Mujahideen, Jundullah and Sipah-e-Saheba etc. These continue to freely operate in Pakistan under ISI patronage and have filled the gap created by weakening Al-Qaeda. The most of vacant Al-Qaeda ranks are now filled with former operatives of these organizations.

Mullah Omar and other prominent Afghan Taliban leaders were sheltered in Quetta and together with Haqqanis who operate from North and South Waziristan, constitute biggest threat to the idea of a stable and progressive Afghanistan. The terrorist attacks against Pak Army constitute something which is known in intelligence parlance as “spill-over effect.” When you fill a large container with water and try to turn it around, water is bound to spill out.

Future Scenario after 2014 US withdrawal

After US military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, the situation in Afghanistan and the region will closely resemble that prevailing prior to 9/11. Afghan Taliban will be effectively controlling not less that 65% of rural Afghanistan. The only difference this time will be that Taliban will not be able to have a free run over major cities and confine legitimate regime to a meager territory in north like it did in 1996 due to a relatively strong Afghan Army backed by international community. Pak Army will try to come to a truce with Pak Taliban and will gradually call off it operations in Tribal areas in return of Pak Taliban stopping its attacks inside Pakistan. A lull in Pak Taliban attacks in Pak hinterland is being already witnessed. The new Nawaz Sharif government has good contacts in Pak Taliban and attempts are already underway for a ceasefire. This will mark de facto partition of Afghanistan on ethnic lines. Though this will also involve minimal physical control of Pak Army over Tribal Areas but the sense for now in Rawalpindi is that this has always been the case since British times and all through the life of Pakistan. Islamabad has always micro-managed Pashtuns by administering them regular doses fundamentalism and unleashing them against India and Afghanistan.

The changed situation will be utilized by Pak Army to re-direct terror groups against India. Terrorist violence has already begun to rise in Jammu & Kashmir and regular ceasefire violations are being reported along Line of Control (LoC) whereby Pak Army attempts to push infiltrators into India. There has been revival of faith in Pak Army about its policy of using terror groups as instruments of State policy as this has been successful against USSR as well as against US in Afghanistan. ISI seeks to overcome the spill-over effect at play in Pakistan by re-deploying these groups from Afghanistan to India. Moreover, starting from Zia era, Pak army has been nurturing these groups and its ranks now suffer from what may be termed as reverse indoctrination, open play out which came to surface when attack on Gen Musharraf was traced back to Pak Air Force Officers and retired ISI officers repeatedly visited tribal areas to co-ordinate Taliban operations. It is just wishful thinking that some open minded General with western leanings can change this character of Pak Army. Even General Kayani had to face some embarrassing moments during his nationwide tours to Army Cantonments explaining the security situation after Osama Bin Laden killing by US forces in Abbottabad.

With each passing day in office, distance between Gen Kayani and other Corps Commanders will be widening in seniority terms which will mean less effective coherence on policy matters. We have seen this transpiring during Gen Zia’s times as well as during Gen Musharraf’s reign. Another problem about guessing the true intentions of Gen Kayani is that most of the policy makers and analysts in West judge them from what he is saying and not from what he is actually doing. Since, General Kayani came into office, ISI’s support for Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network has become more bold and overt. The attacks carried out by these groups in Afghanistan have become more and more audacious. ISI has opted for such a flimsy deniability that worst attacks in Kabul have been easily traced back by US and Afghan intelligence to Haqqani-ISI linkages. Moreover, Gen Kayani’s public discourses after killing of Osama Bin Laden by US forces in Abbottabad, though invoking Pakistan’s sovereignty have been no less than mourning. ISI immediately laid hands over Dr. Shakil Afridi who was instrumental in providing necessary information to CIA for raid on Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad and despite immense pressure from highest levels of Obama Administration and Capitol Hill, Pakistan has repeatedly refused to release him. Terror infrastructure against India has been kept well-preserved. All these are clear pointers that Pak Army intends to revert to its policies of pre-9/11 era. Another point that is to be noted is that despite immense US military presence in Afghanistan and billions of dollars being given in aid to Pak, Pak Army has not complied with US strategic goals in Afghanistan and continued its support for Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network. In such a situation, it is nothing else but self-deception to assume that Pak Army will be working for a stable Afghanistan after US withdrawal in 2014. Doha talks with Taliban will only give acceptability and legitimacy to Taliban and it will only be pursuing its well known agenda after 2014. Af-Pak is going to be theatre of another phase of Saudi-Iran proxy war which is already intensifying since this Muharram. The magnitude of recent attacks on Shias in the region is fast catching up with those witnessed in Iraq.

The most unfortunate thing is that after more than a decade on international efforts, Af-Pak seems to be all set to be back to square one. This region will again be the haven in which Islamic fundamentalists will be taking refuge from all over the world and from which indoctrinated trained terrorists will be dispatched to create chaos across the world.