Recent Gauhati HC decision on constitutional validity of CBI
has sparked off a similar debate about India ’s
premier intelligence agency, Intelligence Bureau (IB) which, according to a RTI
reply by Home Ministry, was created through consent given by Secretary of State
for India .
However, the nature of IB’s functions makes it a case in
complete contrast to that of CBI. CBI exercises various police powers like
arrest and prosecution, which essentially involve deprivation of “personal
liberty” of the accused. Under Article 21 of the Constitution, any such denial
of personal liberty requires support of “formal” executive or legislative
action.
IB, in contrast, does not exercise any of the police powers
under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Neither does it arrest nor does it
prosecute anybody. It is just an information gathering mechanism of the
government. This also makes IB different from intelligence-cum-investigation
agencies like FBI which apart from gathering intelligence perform police
functions of arrest and prosecution.
Some of IB’s functions like electronic espionage which may
involve invasion of constitutional guarantee of “personal liberty” as enshrined
in Article 21 are performed under formal laws like Telegraph Act which provide
for “due procedure” as well as oversight of “competent authority” like Home
Secretary, thus satisfying the requirement of constitutional jurisprudence as
evolved by Supreme Court through a series of decisions.
The mention of Central Bureau of Intelligence in Schedule
VII of the Constitution is an enabling provision investing the Parliament with
legislative competence to enact laws for the re-creation or regulation of such
an agency. A perusal of Entries in Schedule VII with its controlling provisions
contained in Articles 245 and 246 makes it pertinently clear that Parliament
“may” legislate on these subjects but it is nowhere mandatory for it to do so.
It may make a choice of not interfering in administrative arrangements which
were already in place at the commencement of the Constitution.
Article 375 which is a special provision in this regard
further reaffirms this position by laying down that “all officers judicial,
executive and ministerial shall continue to exercise their respective functions,
subject to the provisions of this constitution.” So, IB as an administrative
mechanism of information gathering continues to be valid on constitutional
standards despite its informal creation.